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NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GENERAL MANAGERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES,
QUALIFICATIONS, AND
CHARACTERISTICS
CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT1, GLENN M. WONG2, AND
DANIEL HATMAN3
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most desirable jobs in all of sports is undoubtedly
that of General Manager (GM).  A GM is generally responsible for
the overall control and direction of the organization, including,
perhaps most importantly, the success of the team on the field,
court or rink.  Perhaps the keen interest in being a GM is best ex-
emplified through fantasy sports.  Fantasy sports enable the fantasy
team’s owner to control an organization and select its players in the
hopes of winning a championship.  The Fantasy Sports Trade Asso-
ciation places the number of fantasy sports participants around 35
million Americans.4  Research has also shown a positive correlation
between players starting in football fantasy leagues for a particular
week and the television rating for those games.5  This correlation
indicates that fans actively track “their” players and are vested in
their results.  The fan, in this case, is afforded the opportunity to
conduct themselves like a GM: to select players, build a roster and
see the outcomes in real time.  With an ever growing pool of people
1. Associate, Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC, New York, NY; J.D./M.B.A., Ford-
ham University School of Law and Graduate School of Business, New York, NY;
B.S., Sport Management, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.  The authors
would like to thank Kate Mullaney, M.B.A./M.S., Sport Management, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, for her assistance with this article.
2. Professor, Department of Sport Management, Isenberg School of Manage-
ment, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA; J.D., Boston College Law School;
B.A. Brandeis University. Professor Wong is the author of ESSENTIALS OF
SPORTS LAW (4th ed. 2010) and THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CAREERS
IN SPORTS (2nd ed. 2012).
3. Pro Scout, Philadelphia Eagles, Philadelphia, PA; M.B.A./M.S., Sport Man-
agement, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA; B.A., Psychology, State Uni-
versity of New York at Albany, Albany, NY.
4. See Fantasy Sports Trade Association, http://fsta.org/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (stating market size at over 35 million adults).
5. See John A. Fortunato, The Relationship of Fantasy Football Participation with
NFL Television Ratings, 3 JOURNAL OF SPORT ADMINISTRATION & SUPERVISION 74, 74-
90 (2011), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jsas/6776111.0003.114?rgn=
main;view=fulltext (listing viewership for certain games and active players).
(427)
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who seek to turn this fantasy into reality, who has the requisite edu-
cation, experience, and skills to make their dreams come true?
Longtime National Football League (NFL) writer Pat Kirwan
aptly summarized the difficulties of the GM position:
Running an NFL franchise isn’t easy. Can you evaluate
personnel, manage a salary cap, negotiate contracts, select
a head coach, handle the media, make tough decisions,
cooperate with an owner, deal with the league office and,
most importantly, carry out a vision for a winning
franchise?  If so, then you qualify for the job.6
Owners of NFL Clubs deciding on whom they want to lead
their Club must ask themselves some difficult questions: What type
of leader do I want? An experienced personnel man that comes in
with a proven plan?  A younger coach or scout with less experience
but new and fresh ideas?  Someone closer to the age of the owner
who can relate to the boss?  Someone who can recruit the best
coach possible?  A man who really knows the talent floating around
the country in the draft and on the free agent market?  How about
a guy with a business-savvy approach?
This article builds upon research done in our two prior arti-
cles.  In the article Major League Baseball General Managers: An Analy-
sis of Their Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, we
discussed the role of Major League Baseball (MLB) GMs, while ex-
amining the evolving paths people have taken to obtain the GM
position.7  In MLB, there has been a clear trend emphasizing
younger, highly educated people with a statistical analysis ap-
proach, while placing less emphasis on playing or coaching experi-
ence.8  Similarly, in the article National Basketball Association General
Managers: An Analysis of the Responsibilities, Qualifications, and Charac-
teristics, we discussed the role of a National Basketball Association
(NBA) GM and examined the evolving paths people have taken to
6. See Pat Kirwan, Need a GM, Here’s a short list of the best candidates, NFL.COM
(Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d80d9b253/article/
need-a-gm-heres-a-short-list-of-the-best-candidates.
7. Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, Major League Baseball General Managers:
An Analysis of Their Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18 NINE: J. BASE-
BALL HIST. & CULTURE 74 (2010) (reviewing and analyzing General Manager posi-
tion in MLB).
8. See id. at 117-21 (discussing decline of playing and coaching experience of
MLB GMs and trend toward younger, highly educated individuals).
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obtain the position.9  This article will discuss the many duties of an
NFL GM while also discussing the qualifications and characteristics
that led them to the position.  Not all NFL Clubs actually employ a
person entitled “GM.”  Additionally, in some Clubs, the GM does
not have final say in player personnel decisions.  This article focuses
on those individuals with final say entering the 2012 NFL season.
II. THE DUTIES OF AN NFL GM10
The broad scope of an NFL GM’s professional responsibilities
can be evidenced by the magnitude of NFL operations.  The NFL
and its thirty-two Member Clubs produced estimated revenues of
$9.3 billion in 2011, or an average of nearly $300 million per
team.11  The clubs share approximately 60 percent of these reve-
nues equally amongst the thirty-two clubs.12  Individual clubs range
in estimated value from $2.1 billion (Dallas Cowboys) to $770 mil-
lion (Jacksonville Jaguars).13  While these figures are not those of
Fortune 500 companies,14 NFL GMs are clearly responsible for
managing high stakes organizations and must make decisions on a
daily basis that greatly impact the organization both on and off the
field.
Depending on the organizational structure, a GM may have de-
cision-making authority or advisory input in all or most aspects of
the Club.  The job description will certainly include football opera-
tions such as coach and staff selection, management of scouting de-
partments, contract negotiations and most importantly, player
9. See Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, National Basketball Association General
Managers: An Analysis of the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 213 (2011).
10. For purposes of this article, the term GM will focus on the person in the
front office who has “final say” in football operations and player personnel matters.
This could be an owner, as in the case of Mike Brown with the Cincinnati Bengals
or Jerry Jones with the Dallas Cowboys, or it could also be a coach, like Bill
Belichick of the New England Patriots.
11. See Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RESEARCH, http://www.plunkettre-
search.com/sports-recreation-leisure-market-research/industry-statistics (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2013) (listing estimates following 2011 season).
12. See Bruce Garrioch, NHL CBA Negotiations Set to be Front Page News,  OT-
TAWA SUN, (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.ottawasun.com/2012/08/11/nhl-negotia-
tions-set-to-be-front-page-news (stating NFL clubs share more than 60 percent of
revenue).
13. See Mike Ozanian, Cowboys Most Valuable NFL Team, FORBES (Sept. 5,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/nfl-valuations/ (valuing Cowboys at $2.1 billion).
14. See Fortune 500, CNNMONEY (May 21, 2012) http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/full_list/401_500.html (noting 500th com-
pany listed on Fortune 500, Molina Healthcare, earned revenues of approximately
$4.7 billion in 2011, more than half of revenues of all NFL Clubs combined).
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personnel decisions.  It may also include business operational items
such as finance, marketing, stadium development, media and com-
munity relations.  As the business of the NFL has grown, so too have
the legal, financial, and operational complications therein.  NFL
front offices have consequently grown to cover these many areas.
GMs now not only oversee a large, complex network of individuals
working in a variety of fields, but must themselves be experts or
near experts in those fields.
A. Salary Cap Management
Many of a GM’s duties must be analyzed within the confines of
the NFL-National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) col-
lective bargaining agreement (CBA).  Pursuant to the National La-
bor Relations Act, employers and employees are obligated to
negotiate in good faith over the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.15  Certain subjects, such as the rate and method of pay, disci-
pline, safety and grievance and arbitration procedures, are
mandatory subjects of bargaining, while others are merely permis-
sive, such as the identity of the bargaining agent, status of supervi-
sors and internal union or company affairs.16  The end result is a
complex CBA that controls the terms and conditions of employ-
ment for NFL players and affects nearly every facet of NFL business.
The most recent NFL-NFLPA CBA was executed in 2011 (2011
CBA) after considerable strife and litigation.17  Understanding the
CBA is essential to a NFL GM’s job duties.
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012).
16. See GLENN WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 527 (ABC-CLIO, 4th ed.
2010) (discussing mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining).
17. See Chris Deubert, Glenn M. Wong & John Howe, All Four Quarters: A Retro-
spective and Analysis of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the Na-
tional Football League, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1 (2012).  The National Football
League Players Association decertified itself as the bargaining representative of
NFL players on March 11, 2011, hours before the expiration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement that the NFL and the NFLPA agreed to in 2006. See id.  That
night, nine current NFL players and one prospective NFL player, led by New En-
gland Patriots quarterback Tom Brady, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL
and its 32 Clubs. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn.
2011).  In addition to the Brady lawsuit, the Players sought damages related to the
NFL’s television contracts that allegedly violated the 2006 CBA. See White v. Nat’l
Football League, 766. F. Supp. 2d 941 (D. Minn. 2011).  Retired players fought for
their rights in the labor negotiations, and the NFL contended that the NFLPA had
failed to bargain in good-faith in a proceeding before the National Labor Relations
Board. See id.  The NFL and NFLPA ultimately reached a settlement of the various
lawsuits and agreed to a new CBA (the 2011 CBA) without missing any regular
season games. See Deubert, supra note 17, at 5. R
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Perhaps the most significant component of the CBA is the Sal-
ary Cap.  The Salary Cap is “the absolute maximum amount of Sal-
ary that each Club may pay or be obligated to pay or provide to
players . . . at any time during a particular League Year.”18  If only it
were that simple.  The legal basis for the Salary Cap and how the
Salary Cap and Salary are determined are complicated issues that a
GM must understand.  While nearly every NFL Club employs a Di-
rector of Football Administration or similarly titled “cap guy,” it is
still essential that GMs understand the history of the Salary Cap, its
present day machinations and how it affects the GM’s ability to
build a winning team.
1. The Legal Basis for the Salary Cap
The first salary cap in professional sports was instituted as part
of the 1984 CBA between the NBA and National Basketball Players
Association (NBPA).19  The concept of a salary cap is clearly in-
tended to place a limit on the amount a sports team can spend on
its players and consequently suppress the price of players’ services
(salaries) in the labor market.  Such an agreement among thirty-
two competitors in a market would generally constitute a violation
of the antitrust laws, which prohibit any contracts, combinations or
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade.20
A salary cap is, however, exempt from the antitrust laws pro-
vided that it is negotiated and agreed to as part of a CBA.21  This
policy is known as the non-statutory labor exemption.22  The Su-
preme Court of the United States has reasoned that “to give effect
to federal labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective
bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed
18. See 2011 CBA, at art. 1 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between
NFL and NFLPA).
19. See NBA Salary Cap Info, INSIDEHOOPS, (July 10, 2012) www.insidehoops.
com/nba-salary-cap.shtml (listing historical data regarding NBA salary cap).
20. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); see also Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (ruling that only “unreasona-
ble” restraints are illegal).
21. See Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 798 (8th Cir. 2011) (stat-
ing that “[u]nless the values of collective bargaining are implicated, federal labor
laws yield to the regular antitrust framework”) (citing Powell v. Nat’l Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1989)).
22. See id. (explaining salary cap becomes non-statutory labor exemption from
antitrust liability when  NFLPA disclaims its role as Players’ collective bargaining
representative).
5
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through the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust
sanctions.”23
The scope of the non-statutory labor exemption has evolved
over time.  In 1972, Baltimore Colts’ tight end John Mackey and
thirty-five other NFL players brought a class action lawsuit against
the NFL and its, at that time, twenty-six Member Clubs.24  The suit
challenged the Rozelle Rule, named after then-NFL Commissioner
Pete Rozelle.25  The Rozelle Rule permitted Commissioner Rozelle
to determine the compensation, in the form of draft picks, players,
or cash, to be paid to a Club who signs a player who most recently
played for a different Club.26
The plaintiffs argued that the Rozelle Rule was an unreasona-
ble restraint on trade under the antitrust laws because it deterred
Clubs from signing free agents and suppressed player salaries.27
The NFL argued that the Rozelle Rule was implemented as part of
the 1968 and 1970 CBAs and therefore immune from antitrust law
by the non-statutory labor exemption.28
In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and found that the Rozelle Rule
was not protected by the non-statutory labor exemption.29  The
Mackey case established an important three-prong test for determin-
ing when the non-statutory labor exemption applies:
23. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236–37 (1996) (explaining diffi-
culty employers and employees experience during collective bargaining due to
lack of competition-restricting agreements needed to compromise).
24. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn.
1975) (establishing that Amended Complaint was filed on October 11, 1972); see
also Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (estab-
lishing that suit was initiated by thirty-six players).
25. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609 (stating suit claimed Rozelle Rule violated
Sherman Act and players sought to “enjoin[ ] its enforcement”).
26. See id. at n.1 (explaining essentials of Rozelle Rule as providing Commis-
sioner Rozelle with power to award compensation to teams that lost free agents in
form of draft choices Commissioner Rozelle deemed fair and equitable).
27. See id. at 609 (stating plaintiffs asserted that “only employee groups are
entitled to labor exemption” and  defendants, employer group, should not be enti-
tled to labor exemption for their unilateral action).
28. See id. at 612–13 (noting defendants claimed Rozelle Rule was “the subject
of an agreement with the players union and that the proper accommodation of
federal labor and antitrust policies requires that the agreement be deemed im-
mune from antitrust liability.”)
29. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (concluding that despite finding that non-la-
bor parties “may potentially avail themselves of nonstatutory labor exemption . . .
the exemption cannot be invoked here” because Rozelle Rule was not product of
“bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.”)
6
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(1) The restraint on trade must primarily affect only the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement;
(2) The issue must concern a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining; and
(3) The issue must have been achieved through arm’s-
length bargaining.30
The Eighth Circuit determined that the NFL did not meet the
third prong in Mackey.31  The court found that, even though the
Rozelle Rule was included in the 1968 and 1970 CBAs, it served no
benefit to NFL players (Players) and had not been accomplished
through arm’s length bargaining.32
The NFL and the Players negotiated new CBAs in 1977 and
1982 over various issues, notably a right of first refusal system in
place of the Rozelle Rule, minimum salaries and benefits.33  The
expiration of the 1982 CBA in 1987 marked a dramatic and litigious
turning point in NFL labor relations that set the bounds of the non-
statutory labor exemption as it is known today.
The Players went on strike for 23 days during the 1987 season,
during which time the NFL used replacement players.34  The Play-
ers decided to end the strike and instead filed a class action lawsuit
challenging the right of first refusal / compensation system that
had existed since the 1977 CBA in the Powell case.35
In Powell, the Players argued that the right of first refusal sys-
tem violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because it unreasonably
30. See id. at 614 (listing certain principles court deduced from previous gov-
erning decisions regarding competing labor and antitrust interests).
31. See id. at 615-16 (noting Rozelle Rule “was unilaterally imposed by the
NFL and member club defendants upon the players” and was not legitimately bar-
gained over).
32. See id. (stating court could not find substantial evidence to support that
both sides engaged in bona fide arm’s-length bargaining over Rozelle Rule prior to
1968 and 1970 CBAs).
33. For more on the 1977 and 1982 CBA negotiations, see Chris Deubert,
Glenn M. Wong and John Howe, All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the
2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19
UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 1 (2012).
34. See id. at 10-11. (explaining players’ response to NFL using replacement
players); Mike Tanier, And Now, a Season of Booth Reviews and Touchbacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SP10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/
sports/football/slower-lower-scoring-nfl-games-are-likely.html?_r=0 (noting impact
replacement players had on statistics for 1987).
35. See generally Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn.
1988) (explaining how non-statutory labor exemption protected teams from anti-
trust liability stemming from CBA provisions that restrained movement of players
between teams).
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restrained player movement.36  The NFL moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the system was protected by the non-statutory
labor exemption.37  The Players responded by contending that the
exemption was no longer applicable because the 1982 CBA had ex-
pired and impasse had been reached.38  Judge David Doty of the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed
with the NFL that the labor exemption survived expiration of the
1982 CBA because the terms and conditions of the 1982 CBA were
still in effect.39  However, Judge Doty also ruled that the labor ex-
emption would expire once an impasse was reached.40
The Eighth Circuit, in 1989, reversed Judge Doty’s decision re-
garding when the labor exemption would expire.41  The Eighth Cir-
cuit ruled that the labor exemption would survive impasse and exist
so long as there was an ongoing collective bargaining relation-
ship.42  In dissent, Judge Donald Lay recognized that the Players’
only option to seek redress under the antitrust laws was to decertify
the NFLPA as its bargaining representative.43
The Players voted to decertify the NFLPA shortly after the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Powell.44  Several NFL players, led by the
aptly named Freeman McNeil, then filed a lawsuit seeking an in-
junction against the NFL’s proposed “Plan B” free agency system
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (providing provisions of Sherman Antitrust Act
that state “[e]very contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is declared to be illegal”); see Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779 (stating players’
complaint was based on NFL’s continuous imposition of anti-competitive player
restraints).
37. See id. at 778 (stating NFL moved for summary judgment declaring that
“challenged restraints are insulated from antitrust scrutiny by operation of the
nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws”).
38. See id. at 781-82 (explaining that plaintiffs argued that because 1982 CBA
expired, there is “no labor exemption from the antitrust laws shields the players”).
39. See id. at 784 (stating that “a reasonably jury could not conclude that the
player restraints contained in the 1982 collective bargaining agreement were not
the product of bona fide arm’s-length negotiations.  Accordingly, summary judg-
ment on this issue shall be entered in favor of defendants.”).
40. See id. at 788 (ruling defendants’ proposed standards would lead to illegal
provisions being exempted from antitrust scrutiny and court could not adopt such
rule).
41. Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-1304 (8th Cir. 1989)
(explaining Eight Circuit’s reversal regarding labor exemption expiration).
42. See id. at 1303 (explaining that labor exemption continue to apply during
impasse if collective bargaining relationship continues).
43. See id. at 1309–10. (recognizing dissent’s concern that Players’ sole redress
via antitrust required decertification of NLFPA as bargaining representative).
44. See Erick V. Posser, Brady v. NFL: How the Eighth Circuit “Saved” the 2011
NFL Season by Supporting Negotiation, Not Litigation, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 603,
620 (2012) (reporting Players’ decision to decertify NFLPA after Powell).
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and wage scale, alleging they violated the antitrust laws.45  The NFL
had altered the right of first refusal / compensation system prior to
the lawsuit in hopes it would be able to prove that the system was
necessary for the survival of the league and was in its least restrictive
form.46  Plan B free agency permitted Clubs to designate 36 players
who would be subject to the right of first refusal/compensation sys-
tem after each season.47  Undesignated players became unrestricted
free agents.48
Judge Doty had already determined that the NFLPA had suc-
cessfully relinquished its ability and right to bargain on behalf of
NFL Players and that the labor exemption no longer applied as part
of the Powell proceedings in 1991.49  The parties in McNeil cross-
moved for summary judgment and Judge Doty ruled in the Players’
favor in 1992, finding that if implemented, Plan B free agency and
the wage scale would likely violate the antitrust laws.50
In 1992, following the McNeil decision, the Miami Dolphins’
Keith Jackson and nine other players filed a lawsuit seeking injunc-
tive relief preventing the implementation of the Plan B free agency
system.51  Judge Doty granted the plaintiffs’ request, finding that
the outcome was likely to be the same based on the McNeil
decision.52
Riding the success of the McNeil and Jackson decisions, the Play-
ers filed a class action lawsuit in 1992 against the NFL seeking in-
junctive relief and antitrust damages for the NFL’s Plan B free
45. See McNeil v. Nat’l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D. Minn.
1992) (explaining suit filed by several Players alleging “Plan B” free agency plan
against antitrust law).
46. See NFL Players Fight for Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL, 9
SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 27-29 (2002) (discussing strategy NFL used to prove Plan B free
agency needed to preserve league).
47. See id. (describing nature of Plan B free agency).
48. See id. (continuing explanation of Plan B free agency).
49. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1358–59 (D. Minn.
1991) (describing District Court’s holding NFLPA no longer represented Players
and inapplicability of labor exemption).
50. See McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 877 (explaining that summary judgment claims
were filed and judge ruled in favor of Players and predicted Plan B would violate
antitrust law).  A trial on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims was held and the
named plaintiffs were granted damages on their claims.  The largest award was
$240,000 for San Diego Chargers’ lineman Dave Richards. See McNeil v. Nat’l
Football League, No. 90-476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
51. See Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D. Minn.
1992) (identifying case by Dolphins player following McNeil decision and request
for injunctive relief).
52. See id. at 230 (relaying that Judge granted Dolphins players’ request for
injunctive relief).
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agency system, the NFL Draft and the NFL Player Contract.53  The
lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was the well-respected and future Hall of
Fame defensive end Reggie White. White v. NFL presented NFL
Clubs with the possibility of over a billion dollars in damages, after
trebling, due to the restrictive policies it had imposed since the ex-
piration of the 1982 CBA in 1987.
On January 6, 1993, the parties reached a Stipulation and Set-
tlement Agreement (SSA), approved by Judge Doty in August 1993,
resolving the White case.54  The SSA included a $200 million payout
to the Players.55  The NFLPA recertified as the official bargaining
representative of the Players as part of the SSA and the SSA be-
came, in sum and substance, the new CBA between the NFL and
Players (the 1993 CBA).56  Judge Doty retained jurisdiction over the
SSA and CBA—an arrangement that would prove controversial in
future years.57
The SSA was a monumental and long overdue resolution to
years of litigation and labor strife.  Furthermore, the 1993 CBA was
a groundbreaking CBA that set the framework for every NFL CBA
since.  The Players gained the right to unrestricted free agency for
the first time in exchange for the first ever Salary Cap in the NFL.58
Players could become unrestricted free agents after five years of ex-
perience and Clubs’ payrolls were limited to a range of 62 percent
to 64 percent of Defined Gross Revenue (DGR) (a mix of agreed
upon League revenues), depending on the year.59
The Salary Cap’s intended purpose is to create parity; a theo-
retical chance for each team to be successful by preventing the
wealthier teams in the larger markets, e.g., the New York Giants,
Dallas Cowboys and Chicago Bears, from buying up all the top tal-
53. See White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1395 (D. Minn.
1993) (identifying class action suit filed by Players for injunction and antitrust
damages as result of Plan B system).
54. See id. at 1462-68 (explaining that Players and NFL reached settlement
agreement).
55. See Will McDonough, Tentative Deal Reached in NFL; Free Agency Among Con-
cessions Made by Owners to NFL Players, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1992, at 59 (identify-
ing $200 million payout included in settlement).
56. See WONG, supra note 16, at 496 (describing settlement agreement that R
reinstated NFLPA as Players bargaining agent and identifying settlement as basis
for new CBA).
57. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1414 (identifying retention of jurisdiction by
Judge Doty).
58. See Wong, supra note 16, at 496 (discussing new CBA which included un- R
restricted free agency and salary cap).
59. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1412–13 (identifying specifics of unrestricted
free agency and salary cap).
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ent.  This statement has proven to mostly be true, though dynasties
still remain.60
Former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, in describing
changes to the Salary Cap in the 2001 CBA, elaborated on the goals
of the Salary Cap:
[u]nder any system you’re going to have a cyclical pattern
of success and failure. The draft ultimately is going to pro-
duce such a pattern. This cap system will do the same. It’s
another governing mechanism. If you succeed, you can’t
keep an inordinate number of players. The up escalator is
a lot faster than it was before.61
The Washington Redskins, a Club that had been to four Super
Bowls in the decade prior to the Salary Cap, were also a target.
Then Redskins GM Charley Casserly responded in kind: ‘‘[t]here’s
a salary cap coming, and our team has to be very aware of that.  We
knew our club would lose players.  This is no surprise.”62  Neverthe-
less, the Redskins have not returned to the Super Bowl and have
only made the playoffs three times in the Salary Cap era.
2. Determination of Salary
The definition of Salary is fairly straightforward.  “ ‘Salary’
means the compensation in money, property, investments, loans, or
anything else of value to which an NFL player . . . is entitled in
accordance with a Player Contract, but not including benefits.”63
The forms of Salary and how they are calculated for Salary Cap pur-
poses, however, is more complicated.  While we briefly discuss the
definitions, calculations and purposes of the various forms of Salary
60. See Larsen et al., The Impact of Free Agency and the Salary Cap on Competitive
Balance in the National Football League, JOURNAL OF SPORTS ECON., Mar. 2009, Vol. 7,
374-90 (2006) (finding that “free agency and salary cap restrictions tend to pro-
mote competitive balance, whereas a concentration of player talent reduces com-
petitiveness among teams”); see also Travis Lee, Competitive Balance in the National
Football League after the 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement, JOURNAL OF SPORTS
ECON., Feb. 2010, Vol. 11, 77-88 (indicating that salary cap has been mostly success-
ful in creating parity in league); see also Has the NFL Salary Cap Created Parity?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, www.fannation.com/blogs/post/109116 (last visited Mar. 22,
2013) (pointing out that despite increased parity from salary cap, dynasties
remain).
61. Peter King, Game Plan, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 30, 1999, at 74 (noting
former commissioner’s belief regarding salary caps ability to create parity).
62. Glen Macnow, Phoenix gets Redskins Receiver Clark, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
March 23, 1993, at 1 (discussing reaction of Redskins’ owner to salary cap).
63. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 13 § 4(a) (2011-2020) [here-
inafter 2011 CBA] (providing definition of salary according to collective bargain-
ing agreement)
11
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below, a more detailed explanation can be found in our prior law
review article, Understanding the Evolution of Signing Bonuses and
Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the 2011
Collective Bargaining Negotiations.64
NFL players are compensated in a variety of ways, including
negotiated compensation, such as “Paragraph 5 Salary,” signing bo-
nuses, option bonuses, incentive clauses, roster bonuses, and
workout bonuses, and non-negotiated compensation, such as play-
off winnings and the Performance-Based Pool.  Article 13 of the
2011 CBA describes how each should be accounted for Salary Cap
purposes.
“Paragraph 5” salary refers to the base compensation paid to
players according to Paragraph 5 of their NFL Player Contract.65
When the average fan thinks of NFL contracts not being guaran-
teed, he or she is thinking of Paragraph 5 salary. Paragraph 5 mini-
mum salaries are based upon the amount of Credited Seasons a
player has earned; for the 2012 NFL season, the minimum salary of
a player with zero credited seasons was $390,000, while for players
with four to six credit seasons the minimum salary was $700,000.66
Signing bonuses are the most common form of guaranteed
compensation, and the most important in terms of Salary Cap cal-
culations.  When a Club gives a player a signing bonus, it prorates,
or amortizes, the bonus over the term of the contract for Salary Cap
purposes, for a period not to exceed five years.67  For example, if a
player signs a 5-year deal with a $10 million signing bonus, the bo-
nus is prorated at an annual value of $2 million. The player’s result-
ing Salary Cap charge for each season of the contract would be $2
million, plus his Paragraph 5 Salary and any other bonuses or in-
centives for that season.
Option bonuses are lump-sum or scheduled payments paid
upon exercise of the option by the Club.  In consideration for the
lump-sum payment, the player’s contract with the Club is extended,
typically for one season.  For Salary Cap purposes, option bonuses
64. 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179 (2009).
65. See id. at art. 1 (explaining definition of salary received by players accord-
ing to particular section of player contract).
66. See id. at art. 26 (providing numerical amounts of NFL minimum salary
based on number of “credited seasons” player has attained).  A “credited season” is
earned when a player is on “full pay status for a total of three or more regular
season games.” See id. at § 2 (describing credited season calculation).
67. See id. at art. 13, § 6(b)(i) (explaining process by which signing bonuses
are prorated).
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are treated as signing bonuses.68  As a result, when an option bonus
is exercised, the bonus is prorated over the remaining years on the
contract, up to a maximum of five years.  Using the example from
earlier (where a player signed a five-year deal with a $10 million
signing bonus), if a Club exercises an $8 million option bonus after
the player’s second season for one additional season, the $8 million
bonus is prorated over the now four years remaining on the con-
tract, increasing the Salary Cap charge for each of those years by $2
million.
Incentives are a broad category of bonuses based on individual
and Club performance with myriad Salary Cap treatment particu-
lars, as will be discussed in more detail below.
Roster bonuses are lump-sum or scheduled payments paid
when a player is on the team’s roster on a specific date, often the
fifth day of the League Year.69  Similarly, workout bonuses are
lump-sum or scheduled payments paid when a player timely reports
and participates in the requisite off-season workouts, weight lifting
sessions, organized team activities or training camps at the team’s
training facility.  Both roster bonuses and workout bonuses almost
always count towards the Salary Cap in the full amount in the year
in which they are paid.
The principal form of non-negotiated compensation that
counts towards a Club’s Salary Cap is the Performance-Based
Pool.70  The Performance-Based Pool, which equaled $3.46 million
per Club in the 2012 League Year, is distributed to players at the
end of each season using a formula that depends on their playing
time, compensation and playing time relative to compensation.71
Essentially, a low paid player who ends up being an important
player on the team can earn in excess of $200,000, or nearly 50% of
their base salary.72  Conversely, high paid players that do not per-
form well may receive only a few thousand dollars.
68. See id. at § 6(b)(iii) (listing terms that “signing bonus” shall include when
calculating proration).
69. See id. at art. 1 (defining a “League Year” as “the period from March [__]
of one year through and including March [__] of the following year, or such other
one year period to which the NFL and NFLPA may agree.”)
70. See id. at art. 28, § 1 (defining “performance-based pool” and its relation
to team’s salary cap).
71. See id. at § 3 (mandating distribution of fund to player each league year).
72. See Chris Deubert & Glenn M. Wong, Understanding the Evolution of Signing
Bonuses and Guaranteed Money in the National Football League: Preparing for the 2011
Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 179, 199 (2009) (explaining
circumstance where low paid player receives large portion of fund at end of league
year).
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3. Determination of the Salary Cap
Substantive changes to the Salary Cap occurred in the 2006
CBA.  The 2006 CBA replaced the DGR definition with that of To-
tal Revenue (TR).73  TR included certain increasingly important
revenue sources not previously included in DGR.  These sources in-
cluded stadium revenues related to football such as concessions,
parking, local advertising and promotion, signage, magazine adver-
tising local sponsorship agreements, stadium clubs, and luxury box
income—revenue sources explicitly excluded from DGR previ-
ously.74  Consequently, TR was significantly higher than DGR had
been.  In exchange, the Players only received approximately 57.5
percent of TR as opposed to a maximum of 65.5 percent of DGR
under the earlier CBAs.75  Moreover, before the Players’ share of
TR was determined, the NFL deducted five percent for expenses
and 1.8 percent for the NFL’s G-3 Stadium Program.76  These ex-
pense deductions were estimated to be approximately $1 billion per
year.77  As a result, the Players actually received much closer to 50
percent of all revenues.78
Despite the changes in the calculations of the Salary Cap, the
actual amounts received by the Players increased significantly in the
2006 CBA as a result of the newly included revenue sources.79  The
increase in player compensation would prove to be a crucial point
of contention moving forward.
Leading into and during the 2011 CBA negotiations and result-
ing lockout it was often said that if the two sides could agree on how
to divide the revenues, then the other issues would fall into place.80
73. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. I, § 3(al) (2006-2012)
[hereinafter 2006 CBA] (defining total revenue as “all of the League and Team
revenues that are included within the definition of Total Revenues, as set forth in
Article XXIV”).
74. See Deubert & Wong, supra note 72, at 181 (listing various revenue streams R
considered to be “total revenue”).
75. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXIV § 4(a) (noting actual percentage R
received by players from new calculations).
76. See id. at § 1(a)(xiv) (providing definition of “Total Revenue”).
77. See Mike Florio, Under Proposed Deal, Players Will Get 48 Percent of the Total
Revenue, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (June 22, 2011, 8:06 AM), http://profootballtalk.
nbcsports.com/2011/06/22/under-proposed-deal-players-will-get-48-percent-of-
the-total-revenue/ (correcting misdirected belief that players receive larger share
of revenue under new collective bargaining agreement’s revenue model).
78. See id. (noting more realistic percentage received by players under new
collective bargaining agreement).
79. See Deubert & Wong, supra note 72, at 181 (describing increase in share R
received by players under 2006 agreement).
80. Mike Florio, With Trust Restored, Talks Turn to Issues Other Than Revenue
Split, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (June 23, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbc
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The NFLPA undoubtedly wanted to ensure that its Players contin-
ued to receive their fair share of revenues that Commissioner Roger
Goodell projected to grow by over $1 billion per year to a goal of
$25 billion in 2027.81
During the 2011 CBA negotiations, the two sides were having
difficulty determining how to divide up the increasingly diverse and
significant revenue streams until a proposal from the NFL’s Trea-
surer, Joe Siclare, was made.82  Siclare substantially proposed the
revenue split to which the two sides agreed.  The parties scuttled TR
and now divide up All Revenue (AR), which includes all revenues
“from all sources, whether known or unknown, derived from, relat-
ing to or arising out of the performance of players in NFL football
games . . . .”83  The Players and Clubs now divide three main “Reve-
nue Buckets,” with the Players receiving the following shares:
(a) 55 percent of League Media.84  League Media includes
all broadcasting revenues, including television, satellite,
radio and internet.85  These revenues were worth approxi-
mately $4 billion in 2011.86
(b) 45 percent of NFL Ventures/Postseason.87  NFL Ven-
tures/Post-season includes all revenues arising from the
sports.com/2011/06/23/with-trust-restored-talks-turn-to-isues-other-than-revenue-
split/ (labeling deal as “done” despite nothing being signed).
81. See Daniel Kaplan, SBJ: Goodell Sets Revenue Goal of $25 billion by 2027 for
NFL, SPORTINGNEWS.COM (Apr. 5, 2010, 7:51 PM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/
nfl/story/2010-04-05/sbj-goodell-sets-revenue-goal-25-billion-2027-for-nfl (convey-
ing message that while $25 billion may be “ambitious” it is unquestionably an indi-
cator of NFL business expansion in recent years).
82. See Mike Florio, Joe Siclare Gets His Props for Propping Up Labor Deal,
PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (July 29, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.
com/2011/07/29/joe-siclare-gets-his-props-for-propping-up-labor-deal/ (describ-
ing innovative idea that propelled talks between two sides during negotiations).
83. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 12, § 1(a) (providing definition of “All R
Revenue”).
84. See id. at art. 12 § 6(a)-(a)(v) (noting subdivision of all revenue into three
separate categories and definition of “league revenue”); see id. at § 6(c)(i) (describ-
ing calculation of “other league year cost amounts”); see also Dex McLuskey and
Aaron Kuriloff, NFL Signs Nine-Year Extensions of Television Contracts With CBS, FOX,
NBC, BLOOMBERG, (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:00PM),  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-12-14/nfl-renews-television-contracts-with-cbs-fox-nbc-networks-through-2022.
html (describing media rights contracts signed by NFL for new collective bargain-
ing agreement); see also 2011 CBA, supra note 19, at art. 12 § 6(c)(i).
85. Id. at art. 12 § 6(a)(i).
86. See Dex McLuskey and Aaron Kuriloff, NFl Signs Nine-Year Extensions of Tele-
vision Contracts with CBS, FOX, NBC, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-14/nfl-renews-television-contracts-with-cbs-
fox-nbc-networks-through-2022.html (noting “NFL currently receives about $4 bil-
lion a year in television rights fees from companies”).
87. 2011 CBA, supra note 63, art. 12 § 6(c)(i). R
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operation of postseason NFL games and all revenues aris-
ing from operating of NFL-affiliated entities, including
NFL Ventures, NFL Network, NFL Properties, NFL Enter-
prises, NFL Productions, and NFL Digital Media Group.88
(c) Forty percent of local revenues.89  “Local revenues in-
clude those revenues not included in League Media AR or
NFL Ventures/Postseason AR,” and specifically include
88. See id. at art. 12 § 6(a)(ii) (describing NFL Ventures/Postseason); see also
Tommy Craggs, Exclusive: Leaked Documents Show Operating Profits for NFL Ventures
Rose 29 Percent Last Year, DEADSPIN (July 15, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://deadspin.com/
5821386/audited-financials-operating-profit-for-nfl-ventures-lp-rose-from-999-mil-
lion-to-13-billion-last-year (describing NFL Ventures).  NFL Ventures is responsible
for negotiating all of the league’s major sponsorship, marketing, and media rights
deals. See id. NFL Ventures, which Commissioner Goodell ran before becoming
Commissioner, includes four wholly-owned subsidiaries: NFL Enterprises, NFL
Properties, NFL Productions, and NFL International. See id.; see also NFL Network,
NFL.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2013), www.nfl.com/nflnetwork (describing NFL
Network).  NFL Network is the league-owned and operated television network de-
voted full-time to the NFL, including broadcasting select Thursday night games.
Id; see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (dis-
cussing NFL Properties and ensuing licensing litigation).  NFL Properties is re-
sponsible for licensing, sponsorship, and marketing. See id. NFL Properties was
the subject of Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League. See id. NFL Properties
was created by the 32 individual Clubs to collectively market and license the Clubs’
individual intellectual property, such as names, colors, logos, and trademarks. See
id.  In 2000, the Clubs—through NFL Properties—granted Reebok an exclusive
license to produce and sell trademarked headwear for the 32 Clubs. See id. Ameri-
can Needle—a former licensee and creator of NFL appareled headwear—could no
longer create headwear with NFL logos and trademarks. See id. American Needle
challenged the exclusive license as an illegal restraint of trade by the 32 NFL
Clubs. See id. The Northern District of Illinois granted the NFL summary judg-
ment after finding that NFL Properties constituted a single entity for antitrust pur-
poses, and therefore there was no contract, combination, or conspiracy to restrain
trade. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943
(N.D. Ill. 2007).  The Seventh Circuit affirmed. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League, 538 F. 3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).  The Supreme Court reversed. See Am.
Needle, 130 S. Ct. 2201.  While the Court noted that NFL Clubs “depend upon a
degree of cooperation for economic survival,” the necessity of cooperation does
not transform concerted action into the independent action of a single-entity. Id.
at 2214.  Furthermore, the Court noted that “even if league-wide agreements are
necessary to produce football, it does not follow that concerted activity in market-
ing intellectual property is necessary to produce football.” Id. at n.7; see also NFL
Films, NFL FILMS, (last visited Mar. 22, 2013), www.nflfilms.com (describing NFL
Productions).  NFL Productions, also known as NFL Films, is the league-owned
film company that for over fifty years has produced award-winning films about the
NFL. See id.; see also NFL.COM Privacy Policy, NFL.COM. (March 30, 2011), http://
www.nfl.com/help/privacy (describing NFL Digital Media Group).  NFL Digital is
responsible for the league’s technology and new media ventures, including www.
nfl.com and NFL Mobile. See id.
89. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, art. 12 § 6(c)(i) (listing Players’ shares of R
local revenues).
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revenues from the sale of preseason television
broadcasts.90
It is important to point out that the amount the Players “re-
ceive” is actually called the Player Cost Amount, which includes the
Players’ benefits.91  In the 2011 League Year, the Player Cost
Amount was pegged at $142.4 million per Club, with $22.025 mil-
lion (15%) of that amount allocated towards Player benefits.92  The
Salary Cap was thus only $120.375 million.93
The 2011 CBA reduced the acceptable range for the Players’
share of revenues to a 1% band.  The Players are limited to an up-
ward band of 48% of AR for League Years 2012-2014 and 48.5%
from 2015-2020.94  At the same time, the Players’ share of AR can-
not be below 47%.95
Under the 2006 CBA, the Players were effectively guaranteed
50 percent of TR, including both salary and benefits.96  The 2006
CBA also prohibited the Players’ share of TR, including both salary
and benefits, from exceeding 61.6 percent of TR.97  AR under the
2011 CBA will exceed TR under the 2006 CBA based on the ab-
sence of expense deductions.  Consequently, the Players are receiv-
ing a more definite piece of a larger pie.
After AR is determined, each Club’s individual Salary Cap must
be calculated.  This process did not change in the 2011 CBA.  Each
Club’s Salary Cap is calculated by deducting Player benefits from
the Players’ share of revenues and then dividing by the number of
Clubs in the NFL.98
The 2011 CBA has, however, made important changes to how
much each Club must spend in actual cash.  Under the 2006 CBA,
Clubs were required to have a Team Salary of at least 84 percent of
their Salary Cap, increasing 1.2 percent annually to a high of 87.6
90. See id. at art. 12 § 6(a)(iii) (describing local revenues).
91. See id. at art. 12 § 6(b) (clarifying terminology relevant for Player salaries).
92. See id (explaining Player Cost Amount and Player benefits for 2011
League Year).
93. See id. at art. XII, § 6(b) (noting salary cap).
94. See id. at art. 12 § 6(c)(ii) (explaining band percentages).
95. See id (noting minimum band percentage).
96. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXIV, § 3 (discussing split of TR). R
The guarantee actually only kicked in when there was a salary cap in place; which
there was in every League Year of the 2006 CBA except for 2010. See id.
97. See id. at art. XXIV, § 4(c) (determining player’s share of TR).
98. Compare 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXIV § 4(a), with 2011 CBA, R
supra note 63, at art. 12, § 6(c)(v) (discussing Salary Cap calculations). R
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percent in 2009.99  However, the calculation of Team Salary is the
same as that used for Salary Cap purposes, meaning it includes the
prorated portions of signing and option bonuses paid in previous
years.100  Consequently, Team Salary was always actually less than
the actual cash paid by the Club for that League Year.
The 2011 CBA is not concerned with what a Club’s Salary Cap
total might be, but rather with the actual amount of cash that is
being spent by the Clubs.  The 2011 CBA requires that the Clubs, as
a collective unit, spend 99 percent of the Salary Cap for the 2011
and 2012 League Years in cash (Guaranteed League-Wide Cash
Spending).101  For each four-year period from 2013-16 and 2017-20,
the Clubs must spend 95 percent of the Salary Cap in cash.102
The 2011 CBA technically does not impose a Salary “floor” for
each Club as the 2006 CBA did.103  The 2011 CBA instead requires
that Clubs spend at least 89 percent of the Salary Cap in cash for
each four-year period from 2013-16 and 2017-20 (“Minimum Team
Cash Spending”).104  The Players are not interested in how Clubs
structure contracts and allocate salaries for Salary Cap purposes,
but instead are concerned with ensuring that the Players actually
receive a certain percentage of money.  A Club that fails to reach
the Minimum Team Cash Spending threshold must pay the
shortfall to its players before the next season.105  There is no Mini-
mum Team Cash Spending in the 2011 or 2012 League Years.
There are, of course, other nuances to the operation of the
Salary Cap.  The NFL Salary Cap is generally considered a “hard”
cap, in that it largely cannot be exceeded.  Other sports’ salary caps
or competitive balance measures vary considerably, including the
NBA’s “soft” salary cap, which permits clubs to exceed the salary cap
99. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXIV, § 5 (stating Team Salary must R
be 84% of their Salary Cap).
100. See id. art. I, § 3(au) (determining calculation of Team Salary).
101. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 12 § 8(a) (discussing salary cap R
requirements).
102. See id. art. 12 § 8(b) (stating that teams must spend 95% of their salary
cap in cash during four-year periods).
103. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXIV § 5(a) (“Each Team shall be R
required to have a Team Salary of at least the Minimum Team Salary at the end of
each Capped Year.”).
104. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 12 § 9(a) (abandoning yearly require- R
ments of 2006 CBA).
105. See id. art. 12 § 9(b) (requiring shortfall payment directly to players).
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 19 14-JUN-13 13:20
2013] NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GENERAL MANAGERS 445
with exceptions.106  The NFL Salary Cap does, however, permit for
certain exceptions for veterans playing for the league minimum.107
Each Club’s Salary Cap is also uniquely based upon whether
certain incentives were earned by the Club’s players in the previous
season.108  The Club’s Salary Cap can be raised or lowered depend-
ing on incentives deemed “likely to be earned” or “unlikely to be
earned.”109  These incentives, outlined in Exhibits A, B and C, Arti-
cle 13, section 6, permit a player’s compensation to be tied to: (A)
Team Incentives, e.g., Points Scored by Team, Points Allowed by
Team, Wins, Super Bowl; (B) Individual Incentives, e.g., Touch-
downs, Rushing Yards, Sacks; and (C) Honors and Recognized Me-
dia, e.g. Pro Bowl and NFL MVP.110  Many incentives are tied to
team statistical performance; if the team met or exceeded the speci-
fied performance in the prior season, the incentive is deemed likely
to be earned, whereas if the team did not meet the specified per-
formance in the prior season, the incentive is deemed not likely to
be earned.111
A likely to be earned bonus must be included as part of Team
Salary in the current year’s Salary Cap.112  If the bonus is subse-
quently not earned, the amount of the bonus is added to the Club’s
Salary Cap for the next season, provided the Club has not exceeded
the Salary Cap.113  Conversely, if a not likely to be earned bonus is
actually earned, the amount must be subtracted from the next
year’s Salary Cap.114
106. See Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, National Basketball Association Gen-
eral Managers: An Analysis of the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 220 (2011) (discussing various exceptions to NBA
salary cap).
107. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXXVIII-A (discussing NFL Salary R
Cap under 2006 CBA); see also 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. XXVII (discussing R
NFL Salary Cap under 2011 CBA).
108. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XXIV § 7(c)(ii–iii); see also 2011 CBA, R
supra note 19, art. XIII § 6(c)(ii–iii).
109. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, §6(c)(i) (“Any incentive within R
the sole control of the player (e.g., non-guaranteed reporting bonuses, off-season
workout and weight bonuses) shall be deemed ‘likely to be earned.’”); see also 2011
CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, § 6(c)(ii–iii) (explaining incentives not likely to be R
earned).
110. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 98-101 (outlining incentives available). R
111. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, § 6(c)(iv) (stating how to identify R
performance likely to be earned).
112. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, § 6(c)(i) (requiring that likely to R
be earned incentives be included in team salary).
113. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, § 6(c)(iii) (stating procedures R
when performance bonuses previously included in salary are not met).
114. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, § 6(c)(ii) (stating procedures R
when performance bonuses not previously included in salary are met).
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The 2011 CBA provides Clubs with further flexibility by permit-
ting Clubs to carry over Salary Cap room from one year to the
next.115  The 2011 CBA does not limit the amount a Club may carry
over.  However, the carry-over amount will be practically limited by
the requirement that each Club spend at least 89 percent of the
Salary Cap in cash for each four-year period from 2013–2016 and
2017–2020.116  Nevertheless, Clubs may be more strategic in their
spending plans and may target specific years for success by signing
better players as a result of carried over Salary Cap room.
When and how to use the Salary Cap’s flexibility can of course
make or break a Club for several years.  Atlanta Falcons President
Rich McKay explained that “[i]f you decide to become one of those
teams that is so-called ‘excellent’ at manipulating the cap, you are
building yourself a window (to win) that gets smaller and smaller as
you continue to manipulate . . . .  But if you are disciplined about
the cap . . . and make hard choices, I think you can keep
winning.”117
Clearly, the Salary Cap is complicated and today’s GMs have
their work cut out for them in understanding it.  As mentioned ear-
lier, most GMs turn over nearly all Salary Cap duties to a Director of
Football Administration, who often is a licensed attorney.  These
positions have become vital, as the Salary Cap ramifications of each
personnel decision comes with considerable financial risk.
Franchises can ill afford to make a mistake that causes long-term
damage to their Salary Cap.  Former New York Jets GM Terry Brad-
way elaborated on the importance of a capable Salary Cap manager:
“I think if you’re set up correctly and you’ve got the right people
doing all those jobs and you can coordinate the salary-cap part of it
with the player personnel part of it and the coaching part of it, then
you’ve got a chance.”118
Bradway’s experience as a GM is a particularly good example
of the importance of a good Salary Cap manager.  Bradway was a
long-time scouting and personnel expert with both the Jets and
Kansas City Chiefs until he ascended to the Jets’ GM position in
115. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 13, § 6(b)(v) (stating how clubs may R
“carry over” salary room).
116. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 12, § 9(a) (outlining minimum team R
cash spending)
117. See Kimberly Jones, Cap I$ King, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Jan. 30, 2005, at 1
(discussing salary cap strategies).
118. See Kimberly Jones, They are all in this together, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Jan.
31, 2005, at 44 (emphasizing importance of salary cap strategy).
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2001.119  That same year, the Jets’ promoted Mike Tannenbaum to
Assistant General Manager.120  Tannenbaum was not an ex-football
player or scout but instead received an accounting degree from the
University of Massachusetts-Amherst and a law degree from Tulane
University.121  Tannenbaum’s considerable experience in handling
the Salary Cap permitted Bradway to do what he did best – evaluate
talent and make personnel decisions.  Tannenbaum’s well-rounded
experience, in fact, helped him to replace Bradway as the Jets’ GM
in 2006, with Bradway returning to a scouting role with the Jets.
Tannenbaum, early on his tenure as GM, explained the impor-
tance of understanding the Salary Cap: “[e]very decision has ramifi-
cations, and that’s probably the most important part of my job, to
make sure we understand those ramifications . . . so that when we
re-sign Chad Pennington or Curtis Martin or Shaun Ellis . . . (I say)
‘now if we do this, here’s what we can’t do.’”122
Again, the importance of the Salary Cap cannot be under-
stated.  Baltimore Ravens General Manager Ozzie Newsome once
said he did not “know of any change that has come along and af-
fected pro football as much.”123  Former Giants General Manager
Ernie Accorsi went further by explaining that the Salary Cap “gov-
erns everything; it’s the last thing I think about when I go to bed
and the first thing I think about when I wake up.”124
4. Rookie Contracts
A rookie, as most everyone is aware, is “a person who has never
before signed a Player Contract with an NFL Club.”125  Drafting of
rookies is one of a GM’s most important jobs, and, until recently,
ensuring that you could sign your top rookies without too much
acrimony was also an important job.
119. See New York Jets Interactive Media Guide, http://www.newyorkjets.com/
ms/media-guide/2012/html/Bradway,-Terry.html (stating Bradway’s experience).
120. See New York Jets Interactive Media Guide, http://www.newyorkjets.com/
ms/media-guide/2012/html/Tannenbaum,-Mike-1.html (stating Tannenbaum’s
experience).
121. See New York Jets Interactive Media Guide, http://www.newyorkjets.com/
ms/media-guide/2012/html/Tannenbaum,-Mike-2.html (stating Tannenbaum’s
experience).
122. See Kimberly Jones, They are all in this together, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Jan.
31, 2005, at 44 (identifying implications of adding salary).
123. See John Eisenberg, Budget Ball, BALTIMORESUN.COM (November 3, 2002),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-11-03/sports/0211030318_1_ravens-salary-
cap-super-bowl (supporting salary cap’s significance).
124. See id. (further supporting salary cap’s significance).
125. 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 1. §1. R
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Rookie compensation had been an increasingly contentious is-
sue entering the 2011 CBA negotiations.  The 2010 first overall
pick, Sam Bradford, agreed to a six-year, $78 million contract with
the St. Louis Rams, including $50 million guaranteed.126  By com-
parison, Tom Brady, a three-time Super Bowl champion and two-
time MVP, received only a four-year, $72 million contract with $48.5
million guaranteed from the New England Patriots prior to the
2010 season.127  As a result, Clubs often looked to trade their high
draft picks to avoid guaranteeing an unproven rookie tens of mil-
lions of dollars.128
The exorbitant sums being paid each year to rookies may have
created the false impression that there was no limit on rookie com-
pensation.  However, the 2006 CBA and the preceding 2001 CBA
included an Entering Player Pool that was the total amount of
money that could be paid to drafted rookies.129  Each Club was pro-
vided the maximum Salary Cap charge (the Rookie Allocation) it
could incur for that League Year.130  The Rookie Allocation was de-
termined based on a formula agreed to by the NFL and NFLPA that
accounted for the number, round, and position in round of the
Club’s draft picks in that year’s NFL Draft.131  The formula
designates a certain Salary Cap charge for each drafted player.  The
combined Salary Cap charges for each Club make up that Club’s
Rookie Allocation.
The 2011 CBA dramatically overhauled and limited the man-
ner in which rookies are compensated.  The Entering Player Pool
remains—relabeled the Total Rookie Compensation Pool— and in-
creases along with the Salary Cap up to five percent plus fifty per-
cent of any increase over five percent.132  However, the 2011 CBA
removed nearly all of the flexibility creative GMs and agents previ-
ously used to inflate rookie compensation within the new Total
Rookie Compensation Pool.
126. See Adam Schefter, Chris Mortenson & THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Rams Give
Bradford 50M Guaranteed, ESPN (July 31, 2010, 9:09 AM), http://sports.espn.go.
com/nfl/news/story?id=5425041 (discussing Bradford’s rookie salary).
127. See Adam Shefter, Mike Reiss, and Associated Press, Tom Brady Signs Ex-
tension, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2010, 3:13 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/nfl/
news/story?id=5552561 (discussing Brady’s lower salary).
128. See Gregg Rosenthal, Talk Increases that Rams Would Trade Down on the
Cheap, PROFOOTBALLTALK (Apr. 20, 2010, 6:53 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2010/04/20/talk-increases-that-rams-would-trade-down-on-the-cheap/
.
129. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XVII § 1(a). R
130. See id. at art. XVII § 3.
131. See id.
132. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 7 § 2(a). R
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 23 14-JUN-13 13:20
2013] NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GENERAL MANAGERS 449
Rookie contract lengths under the 2011 CBA are “fixed and
unalterable.”133  Rookies drafted in the first round are limited to
four-year contracts with a Club option for a fifth year.134  Under the
2006 CBA, rookies drafted in the first 16 picks could sign six-year
contracts and rookies drafted in picks 16 through 32 could sign five-
year contracts.135  Rookies drafted in rounds two through seven
must now sign four-year deals.136  Previously, under the 2006 CBA,
rookies in rounds two through seven were limited to four-year
deals, but they were not mandatory.137  Additionally, Clubs will hold
an option on their first round picks for a fifth year.138
The 2011 CBA continues only to restrict player compensation
during the first year of the contract.  Nevertheless, circumvention
of the Rookie Compensation Pool’s purpose is nearly impossible
due to the restricted contract lengths and the prohibition on previ-
ously used mechanisms.  The 2011 CBA specifically prohibits “op-
tion bonuses, option exercise fees, option nonexercise fees, Salary
Advances . . . voidable year(s) provisions, buybacks of voidable
year(s) provisions, and any “contract with the contract” (i.e. terms
and conditions of a contemplated superseding contract within the
Rookie Contract).”  In addition, the 25 Percent Rule, barring a
player’s Salary Cap charge to grow by more than twenty-five percent
per year unless he was being paid the minimum Paragraph 5 sala-
ries, remains.139
Most importantly, the Rookie Compensation Pool was clearly
reduced from years past.  The new rookie compensation system re-
sulted in 2011 first overall pick Cam Newton agreeing to a four-year
fully guaranteed contract for $22,025,498 with the Carolina
Panthers,140  representing a nearly $28 million decrease in guaran-
teed money compared to Sam Bradford’s 2010 contract.
133. See id. at § 3(a) (discussing rookie contracts under 2011 CBA).
134. See id. (describing impact of 2011 CBA on rookies).
135. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XVII § 5 (describing previous limita- R
tions on rookies under previous CBA).
136. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 7 § 3(a) (illustrating changes be- R
tween 2006 and 2011 CBAs).
137. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XVII § 5 (commenting previous limi- R
tation under 2006 CBA).
138. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 7, § 7 (providing additional differ- R
ence between 2006 and 2011 CBA).
139. See id. § 3(e) (stating 25 Percent Rule remains in 2011 CBA).
140. See Michael David Smith, Cam Newton, Panthers Agree to Four Year, $22 mil-
lion Contract, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (July 29, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://profootball
talk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/29/cam-newton-panthers-agree-to-four-year-22-mil-
lion-contract/ (describing Cam Newton’s contract with Carolina Panthers).
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Holdouts, whereby a rookie refuses to report to training camp
until his contract demands are met, were a principal reason rookie
contract amounts and structures were significantly curtailed in the
2011 CBA.  Rookie holdouts became commonplace in the years
leading up to the 2011 CBA as first round compensation massively
outgrew the compensation of other rookies.  For example, in 2009,
former Texas Tech wide receiver and tenth overall pick Michael
Crabtree held out until the eighth week of the regular season
before agreeing to a six-year deal with the San Francisco 49ers.
Crabtree was unhappy with his overall draft slot and potential com-
pensation and instead demanded a package that was worth more
than the seventh overall selection, former Maryland wide receiver
Darrius Hayward-Bey, drafted by the Oakland Raiders.141  Crab-
tree’s only leverage was to threaten not to play the 2009 season and
enter the 2010 draft in hopes of obtaining the contract he wanted.
The 49ers were forced to find creative ways to make Crabtree happy
without disrupting the slotting system that is part of NFL rookie
contract negotiations.142
In general, the new rookie compensation system significantly
limits the scope of rookie contract negotiations, permissible provi-
sions and thus holdouts.  The new system is much closer to the sys-
tem used in the NBA, in which each draft position is specifically
allocated a salary.143  The largely predetermined compensation
structure will greatly reduce the threat of rookie holdouts, as play-
ers will have little choice or leverage in negotiating how much they
want to make.144
141. See Rookie WR Crabtree ends holdout, signs six-year deal with 49ers, NFL, http:/
/www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d81339261&template=with-video-with-com-
ments&confirm=true (updated Oct. 8, 2009, 4:27 PM) (outlining Michael Crab-
tree’s holdout and subsequent contract with San Francisco 49ers).
142. See Peter King, Monday Morning QB, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/peter_king/08/16/mmqb/2.html#ixzz1KjL9dx
Y1 (updated Aug. 17, 2009, 12:08 P.M.) (“The NFL has a slotting system that is
ever-so-slightly malleable, where a player who gets drafted one spot lower than
another player occasionally gets a smidgeon of a better deal.  And sometimes a
quarterback gets an above-market deal.  But position players and non-quarterback
skill players are slotted, and despite the efforts of agents to break the slotting sys-
tem when picked lower than the agent or player thinks he should be picked, the
league mostly holds firm.”).
143. See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Basketball Associ-
ation and the National Basketball Players Association, art. VIII (b)(i) [hereinafter
2005 NBA-CBA]; 2005 NBA-CBA ex. B (comparing new CBA to system in NBA).
144. See Mike Florio, Under New CBA, Rookies Won’t Have Much of a Reason to
Holdout, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (July 23, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://profootballtalk.
nbcsports.com/2011/07/23/under-new-cba-rookies-wont-have-much-of-a-reason-
to-hold-out/ (predicting impact of predetermined compensation structure on
holdouts by rookies).
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Assuming a player has successfully been drafted, signed his
rookie contract, made the Club and played for the Club, the next
question becomes when can the player execute a new and im-
proved contract.  Rookie contracts previously could not be renego-
tiated until after the player’s second season.145  Consequently,
players had to wait at least until after their second year to consider
holding out for purposes of obtaining a new contract.  Some
Clubs—notably the Philadelphia Eagles—renegotiated rookie con-
tracts after the second year believing they could negotiate a long-
term deal at a lower salary than if the player were closer to free
agency.146  This strategy, although potentially cost-saving, also in-
vited young players to demand higher salaries, whether privately or
in the media, based on limited credentials.  The 2011 CBA has fur-
ther limited the leverage of rookies who have outperformed their
contracts by prohibiting renegotiation of rookie contracts until af-
ter a player’s third season.147  The type of contract a player can ne-
gotiate as a veteran is discussed below.
5. Veteran Contracts
A “Veteran” is any “player who has signed at least one Player
Contract with an NFL Club.”148  The different types of veterans and
their ability to sign contracts is more complicated.
Players with less than three accrued seasons are known as “Ex-
clusive Rights Players” and can only negotiate with their previous
Club, provided the Club “tenders” or offers the player a one year
contract with the minimum Paragraph 5 Salary by March 1.  If the
previous team has not tendered the player by that date, the player is
free to sign with any team without penalty or compensation from
his prior Club.149  Exclusive Rights Players generally consist of
young players signed to one or two-year deals, desperate to stay in
the NFL.
A player gains a little more leverage once he has played three
seasons in the NFL.  If a player’s contract expires after his third
season but before his fourth, he is a “Restricted Free Agent.”150  A
145. See 2006 CBA, supra note 73, at art. XVII § 4(i) (describing previous limi- R
tations under 2006 CBA).
146. See Greg Rosenthal, New CBA Limits Early Renegotiated Contracts, PROFOOT-
BALLTALK.COM (July 25, 2011, 10:26 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/
2011/07/25/new-cba-limits-early-renegotiated-contracts/ (describing Philadelphia
Eagles strategy for resigning players).
147. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 7 § 3(k)(i) (stating requirement). R
148. Id. at art. 1.
149. See id. at art. 9, §1(a) (stating rule).
150. See id. at art. 9, § 2 (stating definition).
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Restricted Free Agent is “completely free to negotiate and sign a
Player Contract with any Club, and any Club shall be completely
free to negotiate and sign a Player Contract with any such player,
subject to [certain] restrictions.”151  Those restrictions provide the
player’s prior Club the right to match any offer made to the player
and to receive compensation if the player signs with a new Club.
The dance begins when the prior Club tenders the player a
one-year contract with a certain Paragraph 5 Salary.  The compensa-
tion the new Club would have to pay is based on that offer.  If, in
2012, the prior Club offered merely a one-year contract for $1.2
million, it only retained a right of first refusal.152  If the prior Club
offered a one-year deal of $2.611 million, it was entitled to a right of
first refusal and one first round draft pick.153  GMs must evaluate
the player’s contribution to the team and apply a tender offer
accordingly.
Moreover, GMs must be astute in their talent evaluations if
they choose to sign a Restricted Free Agent and risk losing a draft
pick.  The compensation scheme has ultimately resulted in little or
no Restricted Free Agents changing teams in recent years.
A significant moment in an NFL player’s career is when he
reaches “Unrestricted Free Agency.”  An Unrestricted Free Agent is
a player with at least four accrued seasons and an expired con-
tract.154  Unrestricted Free Agents are free to negotiate with any
Club and offer their services to the highest bidder.
The free agency period is not only exciting and anxious for the
players but also for the GMs.  A new League Year begins each year
in early March.  As soon as the clock strikes 12 a.m. eastern stan-
dard time on the new League Year, all Unrestricted Free Agents are
free to sign with any team of their choice and Clubs, coaches, and
GMs can begin wooing the Unrestricted Free Agents.
Prior to the opening of free agency, it is important for the GM
and his staff to coordinate a plan.  The GM, with the help of his
coaches and scouts, must identify the particular players they are in-
terested in signing and the priority of attack.  The GM must then
check with the Director of Football Administration to get a sense of
how much each player is likely to command on the open market
and to ascertain what the Club’s Salary Cap and financial position
can handle.  It is then up to the GM and typically the head coach to
151. See id. at art. 9, § 2.
152. See id. at art. 9, § 2(b)(1) (explaining rule).
153. See id. at art. 9, § 2(b)(4) (explaining rule).
154. See id. at art. 9, § 1(a) (defining term).
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make what is essentially a recruiting call at midnight to the player
and his agent, offering their best pitch why the player should be
interested in joining their Club.
Before Clubs even begin thinking about signing Unrestricted
Free Agents, they generally focus on resigning their own impending
Unrestricted Free Agents.  After the Super Bowl in early February,
Clubs generally have about a month to negotiate new deals with
their impending Unrestricted Free Agents, during which time the
player cannot yet talk to other Clubs.
Besides simply offering an enticing deal to the player, Clubs
can also use the Franchise “tag” in an effort to retain the player’s
services.  Clubs are permitted to designate one player as a
“Franchise Player” by tendering to the player a contract with spe-
cific terms.155
There are two types of Franchise Player tags.  First, if the Club
is willing to let the player talk to other Clubs, it can tender the
Nonexclusive Franchise Tender in which the Club offers the player
a one year contract for the average of the five largest prior season
salaries for players at the same position, or 120% of the player’s
prior season salary, whichever is higher.156  If the player signs with a
new Club, the new Club must compensate the prior Club with two
first round draft picks.157  No player ever designated as Franchise
Player has ever signed with another Club as a result of this high
compensation.
Second, if the Club does not want the player to have the oppor-
tunity to discuss a contract with another Club, it can make an Exclu-
sive Franchise Tender.  The Exclusive Franchise Tender requires
the Club to offer a one year contract for the average of the five
largest salaries at the same position as of the end of the Restricted
Free Agent Signing Period.158  The Restricted Free Agent Signing
Period extends into the new League Year and thus includes any new
contracts entered into in the offseason prior to the new League
Year, potentially raising the tender amount.
Designating a Franchise Player becomes a tricky political situa-
tion for the GM.  On the one hand, the GM is telling the player that
the Club believes he is one of the top players at his position and an
important part of the Club.  On the other, the GM is essentially
saying that the Club is unsure of the player’s long-term prospects
155. See id. at art. 10, § 1 (explaining franchise tags).
156. See id. at art. 10 § 2(a)(i) (explaining first type of franchise tag).
157. See id. at art. 10 § 2(a)(i) (stating rule).
158. See id. at art. 10 § 2(a)(ii) (discussing second type of franchise tag).
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and does not want to commit to the player.  Consequently,
Franchise Players often strive to negotiate a long-term deal with the
leverage that they will not sign the tender and report to training
camp on time.  In the 2012 offseason, twenty-one players were des-
ignated as Franchise Players.159  Ultimately, twelve players reached
long-term deals with their Clubs while nine players were unable to
do so and were forced to sign the one-year tender.160
An essential party to any contract negotiation is the player’s
NFLPA certified contract advisor, or agent.  The National Labor Re-
lations Act dictates that an employee’s union, such as the NFLPA, is
the “exclusive representative[ ]” of employees concerning the em-
ployee’s “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other condi-
tions of employment.”161  The NFLPA, however, like the other
unions in professional sports, has chosen to certify agents to re-
present players in contract negotiations.  Agents undergo a fairly
rigorous certification process and their compensation is generally
limited to 3% of the player’s contract.162
A GM’s relationship with agents can be essential not only in
recruiting Unrestricted Free Agents, but also in keeping a Club’s
current players happy and performing at a high level.  “A lot of it
starts with your relationships with the individual agents,” Former
Denver Broncos GM Ted Sundquist said. “It’s very important to
spread yourself broadly when it comes to agents, because you never
know who you’re going to have to work with to get the player you
want for your team.”163  Tannenbaum echoed those sentiments, ex-
plaining that strong relationships with agents are essential to ob-
taining industry information and, specifically, information about
players that the Club might not otherwise be able to obtain.164
Agents are particularly adept at providing information on prospec-
tive draft picks, which can have an inescapable impact on a GM’s
career.165
159. See Michael David Smith, 2012 NFL franchise players, NBC SPORTS (July 16,
2012), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/07/16/2012-nfl-franchise-play-
ers/ (listing “2012 franchise players”).
160. See id. (listing 2012 franchise players).
161. NLRA, § 9(a).
162. See NFL Players Association, NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advi-
sors, at § 4(B), NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (June 2012), http://images.nflplayers.
com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/SCAA/2012_NFLPA_Regulations_Contract_
Advisors.pdf (discussing agent certification).
163. See Anthony Cotton, Good idea to keep agents in touch, DENV. POST, Sept. 18,
2005, at J05, available at 2005 WLNR 14766944.
164. Interview with Mike Tannenbaum, former General Manager, New York
Jets of the NFL (March 28, 2013).
165. See id.
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GMs generally develop relationships with agents long before
becoming GM.  When Phil Emery was hired as the Bears’ GM just
prior to the opening of free agency in 2012, it was seen as a plus
that he already had strong relationships with many agents “from his
long run as a college scouting director and area scout.”166  Emery,
while working as a scout, would have also used those relationships
with agents to gain valuable information about college players the
Bears were considering drafting.  Agents will often have a chance to
get to know the college player better and gain a better sense of what
type of person the kid is.
B. Roster Management
A GM’s first priority is to put players on the field that will win
football games.  Regardless of all the other duties of a GM, at the
end of the day a GM must be able to recognize talent.  To that end,
as will be discussed throughout this article, GMs generally delegate
and supervise many important Club functions so that they can focus
on player personnel decisions.
Shaping an NFL roster includes various important dates.  At
the conclusion of one season, the GM will generally hold an organi-
zational meeting where the team’s scouts (Professional and Col-
lege), coaches, and even medical personnel come together to
discuss the previous season, the makeup of the Club and plan off-
season priorities.167  The GM and his team of scouts will evaluate
and grade the current players and compare these grades to the up-
coming free agent market.  From these grades, the GM will work
with his Salary Cap specialist to determine where the team should
allocate its financial resources, whether it be locking up young tal-
ent to long-term contracts, re-signing pending free agents, or to fo-
cus on acquiring other free agents.
As discussed above, the GM will then lead the Club into the
free agency period in early March, seeking to sign marquee free
agents while also seeking to find solid players at less celebrated posi-
tions such as offensive line and reliable backups to fill out the 53-
man roster.  The unheralded signings might not make front page
news on the day the ink dries, but can make or break a GM and a
Club in any given season.
166. See Brad Briggs, Bears’ Emery getting down to business, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23,
2012, at 7, available at 2012 WLNR 3882603.
167. See Peter King, The Next Step is the Hardest, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Vol. 109,
Issue 9, Sept. 8, 2008, at 50-58 (discussing Cleveland Browns offseason strategy).
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Before the Club gets to its regular season 53-man roster, the
Club can carry as many 90 players on its roster during the offseason
and training camp.168  Consequently, Clubs have many personnel
decisions to make in filling and then paring down the roster.
While some teams add big pieces during free agency, other
teams necessarily lose key players.  Former Indianapolis Colts,
Panthers, and Buffalo Bills GM Bill Polian has a unique view of
these losses.  He explained that he had learned from baseball exec-
utives such as Jim Hendry, formerly of the Chicago Cubs, and Theo
Epstein, formerly of the Boston Red Sox and currently of the Cubs.
“They don’t worry about losing free agents every year[,]”  Polian
said.  “[The Colts] lose the off-season every year. The baseball peo-
ple have helped me understand it’s meaningless.”
“There are different ways you can acquire players in the Na-
tional Football League,” says Cowboys Head Coach Jason Garrett.
“The draft is a big part of it. Signing your own players and also
signing free agents is a big part of it as well.”169  Polian, in contrast,
often let very good players leave the Club as free agents to be re-
placed by younger players in the NFL Draft.  Polian believed in
spending the majority of his budget on indispensable players and
then trusting his scouts to find winning players at other positions.170
Polian achieved considerable success with one indispensable player,
quarterback Peyton Manning, during his tenure with the Colts, in-
cluding the 2006 Super Bowl championship.  As free agency begins
to settle, all eyes turn to the NFL Draft.
1. NFL Draft
The NFL Draft consists of seven rounds, in which each Club is
initially allotted one pick.171  Clubs can be awarded additional com-
pensatory selections based on the results of free agency, according
to a formula agreed to by the NFL and NFLPA.172  The NFL Draft is
a Club’s principal opportunity to get cheap, young and exciting tal-
ent.  Poor drafts, however, can also doom a GM and Club.  This
section will discuss the mechanics of the NFL Draft, while the Col-
168. See art. 11 § 3(g).
169. See Tom Orsborn, Cowboy’s to rely on Ryan’s ability, FOX SPORTS (May 4,
2011), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/Cowboys-to-rely-on-Ryans-abilityJones-
Unit-will-thrive-under-defensive-guru-76931430 (quoting Cowboys Coach).
170. See Peter King, The P’s Have it, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Vol. 107, Issue 19,
Nov. 12, 2007, at 38 (discussing Buffalo Bills GM, Bill Polian).
171. See art. 6 § 2(a).
172. See art. 6 § 10.
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lege Scouting section below will discuss how Clubs make their draft
selections.
Many argue that the NFL Draft is the most important “building
block” for a GM.173  Former NFL General Manager Bobby
Beathard, whose teams went to seven Super Bowls, said of the Draft,
“I think it is the foundation of the entire league . . . [i]t’s the most
important part of putting your team together.  You build everything
around the draft.  You mold your team around the draft.  For me,
free agency, what you are getting sometimes, is too risky.”174
Following the Green Bay Packers’ 2011 Super Bowl victory,
General Manager Ted Thompson was lauded for his roster manage-
ment, especially his work in the Draft.175  From 2006 to 2011,
Thompson made 57 Draft selections, 28 of which were still on the
roster for the Club’s Super Bowl victory, including 13 starters.176
The Packers were dethroned the next season by a Club with
similar Draft success, the Giants.  The Giants, led by GM Jerry Reese
since 2007, have also been praised for his Draft selections.  Reese
has been successful not only with his early round selections, such as
first-rounders Aaron Ross (2007), Kenny Phillips (2008), Hakeem
Nicks (2009), and Jason Pierre-Paul (2010), but has also found sev-
eral later round gems that contributed mightily to the Giants’ 2008
and 2012 Super Bowl victories, such as Ahmad Bradshaw (7th
Round in 2007), Kevin Boss (5th Round in 2007), and Mario Man-
ningham (3rd Round in 2008).177
173. See Larry Weisman, Build a Foundation? Start by stockpiling draft picks,
WASHINGTON REDSKINS (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.redskins.com/news-and-
events/article-1/Build-a-Foundation-Start-By-Stockpiling-Draft-Picks/847a9bb4-d0
c9-40e2-935a-3be7c9981365 (discussing importance of NFL draft).
174. See Thomas George, An inside look on how teams approach the NFL draft,
NFL (Apr. 22, 2009), (quoting NFL General Manager Bobby Beathard).
175. See Tom Oates, Can’t Pick on Thompson for His Picks, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 7,
2010, at D1, available at 2010 WLNR 24224437 (praising Thompson’s draft ap-
proach and selections).
176. Compare Green Bay Packers Draft History, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/draft/
history/fulldraft?teamId=1800&type=team (providing draft history of Packers),
with 2010 Green Bay Packers Statistics and Players, PRO-FOOTBALLREFERENCE.COM,
http://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/gnb/2010.htm (providing roster
for 2010 Packers).
177. Ross signed with the Jacksonville Jaguars prior to the 2012 season.  Phil-
lips played in 49 games for the Giants between 2008 and 2011, starting 36 and
recording eight interceptions).  Nicks played in 42 games for the Giants between
2009 and 2011, starting 33, during which time he caught 206 passes for 3,072 yards
and 24 touchdowns.  Pierre-Paul exploded onto the scene in the 2011 season, re-
cording 86 tackles, and 16.5 sacks, earning Pro Bowl and First Team All-Pro Hon-
ors.  Bradshaw played in 70 games for the Giants from 2007 through 2011, sharing
running back duties with Brandon Jacobs.  During that time, Bradshaw accumu-
lated 3,295 rushing yards and 30 touchdowns.  Boss played in 58 games for the
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The Giants’ success likely speaks well of Reese’s managerial ef-
forts in light of the comments from his predecessor and mentor,
Ernie Accorsi.  Accorsi, in discussing his decision to defer to Reese
and coach Tom Coughlin’s preference for defensive end Matthias
Kiwanuka during the 2006 Draft, stated: “I decided to let them have
their way.  A GM shouldn’t always be heavy-handed.  The front of-
fice is a team, too.  This was good for the team.  And, obviously, it
wasn’t a franchise-changing decision.  If it had been a franchise-
changing decision, I’d have ignored everybody and insisted on hav-
ing my own way.”178
Clubs take different approaches to handling their allotted draft
picks.  The Patriots, five-time AFC Champions between 2001 and
2011, led the NFL with a total of 51 total draft picks between 2006
and 2010.179  In contrast, the Patriots’ rival, the Jets, had the least
number of draft picks with only 27.180
Rather than bring in a large number of rookies, the Jets, in-
stead, have focused on trading their draft picks so as to allow the
team to move up in the Draft where they can draft better players.
For example, in 2007, the Jets traded picks in the first round (25th
overall), second round (59th), and fifth round (164th) to the
Panthers for the Panthers’ 14th overall slot and a sixth round
pick.181  The Jets used the 14th overall pick to draft Darrelle Revis,
now a perennial Pro Bowler cornerback.  Then, in 2009, the Jets
traded three players, their first round pick (17th overall), and sec-
ond round pick (52nd) for the Cleveland Browns’ fifth overall pick,
which the Jets used to draft quarterback Mark Sanchez.182
The Jets’ strategy presupposes that they are able to find a trade
partner on or before draft day.  Luckily, over the years, these part-
Giants from 2007 through 2010, starting 45, during which time he caught 119
passes for 1,600 yards and 18 touchdowns.  Manningham played in 59 games for
the Giants from 2008 through 2011, starting 28, during which time he caught 160
passes for 2,315 yards and 18 touchdowns.
178. TOM CALLAHAN, THE GM 17 (Broadway Books, The Crown Publishing
Group 2008).
179. See Matt Maiocco, Five Year Study of NFL Drafts, Apr. 4, 2011,http://www.
chiefsplanet.com/BB/archive/index.php/t-243668.html (ranking draft selections
for all thirty-two teams in past five years). .
180. See id.
181. See Karen Crouse, Jets Trade Up to Draft Revis With 14th Pick, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/sports/football/29jets.
html (providing insight to Jets’ draft-picking mentality and plan).
182. See 2010 NFL Draft Pick Transactions, PROSPORTTRANSACTIONS.COM, last
visited Mar. 13, 2013 http://www.prosportstransactions.com/football/Draft
Trades/Years/2010.htm (listing all draft picks and transactions at 2010 draft, in-
cluding those of Jets).
32
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 33 14-JUN-13 13:20
2013] NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GENERAL MANAGERS 459
ners have not been hard to find.  In the 2010 offseason and Draft
there were 86 trades involving 109 draft picks.183  Forty-four of
these trades involved a total of 55 players, while the remaining 42
trades were draft picks only.184
Trades of top ten draft positions, however, remained rare until
the 2011 CBA.  Between 2008 and 2011 there were only five trades
involving top ten draft positions.185  The limited mobility at the top
of the draft was due to two main factors: (1) the compensation of
top ten selections; and (2) the perceived “value” of a top ten pick.
Rookie compensation had increased so dramatically that Clubs
actually preferred to draft later in the first round rather than be
forced to guarantee tens of millions of dollars to unproven rookies.
The 2011 CBA resolved this issue by reigning in rookie compensa-
tion, as discussed above.  Not surprisingly then, there were six
trades involving top ten draft selections in the 2012 Draft.186
The perceived value of a top ten overall pick stems from the
Cowboys’ creation and use of the “Trade Value Chart.”  In the 1991
NFL Draft, coming off a 7-9 season, the Cowboys had ten picks in
the first four rounds.187  Consequently, it seemed likely that the
Cowboys would be active in the trade market during the Draft.
However, Cowboys coach Jimmy Johnson lamented that he had no
way of knowing how much certain picks were worth, e.g., is a third
round draft pick more valuable than fifth and seventh round
picks?188
Mike McCoy, a Cowboys executive and minority owner, set out
to create a solution to Johnson’s problem.  McCoy examined all
NFL Draft day trades in the previous four years to determine how
183. See id (describing all trades between teams during 2010 draft).
184. See id (detailing all trades made by teams for 2010 draft transactions).
185. See History: Pro Football Draft History, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http:/
/www.profootballhof.com/history/general/draft/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 22,
2013) (providing in-depth coverage of draft picks from 1930’s to present day).
The trades resulted in: the New Orleans Saints drafting Sedrick Ellis with the sev-
enth overall pick in 2007; the Jacksonville Jaguars drafting Derrick Harvey with the
eighth overall pick in 2007; the New England Patriots drafting Jerod Mayo with the
tenth overall pick in 2007; the Jets’ trade for Sanchez in 2008; and the Atlanta
Falcons drafting Julio Jones with the sixth overall pick in 2011. See id.
186. See History: Pro Football Draft History, supra note 185 (explaining that R
Clubs, picks, and players involved were: Washington Redskins, 2nd overall, Robert
Griffin, III; Cleveland Browns, third overall, Trent Richardson; Minnesota Vikings,
4th overall, Matt Kalil; Jacksonville Jaguars, 5th overall, Justin Blackmon; Dallas
Cowboys, 6th overall, Morris Claiborne; and Tampa Bay Buccaneers, 7th overall,
Mark Barron).
187. See TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ AND L. JON WERTHEIM, SCORECASTING 174
(2011) (describing situation).
188. See id. (illustrating situation).
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Clubs had valued certain positions in the Draft.189  McCoy did not
seek to determine whether the Clubs’ perceived valuations were ac-
curate but sought to examine how Clubs had acted in the past.190
McCoy’s end product was the Trade Value Chart which assigned
numerical values to each pick in the Draft.  For example, the first
overall pick is worth 3,000 points, the second overall pick is 2,600
points, the first pick of the second round is 580 points and so on,
until the last pick is worth 0.4 points.191
The Cowboys used the Trade Value Chart during the 1991
Draft to draft a total of 17 players.192  The Cowboys improved to 11-
5 in 1991 and won the Super Bowl in 1992.  McCoy’s Trade Value
Chart became legendary.  Cowboys assistants took promotions with
other Clubs and made sure to take the Trade Value Chart with
them, cementing its use around the NFL.
Despite its widespread use, the Trade Value Chart has proven
to be inaccurate and unreliable.  Cade Massey of Duke University
and Richard Thaler of the University of Chicago compared the
value Clubs placed on certain Draft positions – based on what the
Club gave up to get to that position – with the actual performance
of the players drafted at that position.193  The research indicated
that Clubs erroneously discount future picks and overvalue early
picks.  The Trade Value Chart claims that the top overall pick is
3,000 points and the first pick of the second round is only worth
580 – meaning you would need at least five picks at the top of the
second round to be able to trade for the first overall pick.  This is
clearly wrong.  The first overall pick is, on average, not even twice as
good as the first pick of the second round.194  These types of errors
permeated the Trade Value Chart, indicating that GMs must ensure
that their Draft day decisions are based on reliable analysis.
2. Undrafted Free Agents
Each year approximately 255 players have the privilege of be-
ing selected in the NFL Draft.  However, these players are not the
totality of new talent for Clubs and GMs to consider.  Any prospec-
tive draftee that goes undrafted immediately becomes eligible to
189. See id. (describing process).
190. See id. (explaining analysis).
191. See id. (demonstrating point system).
192. See id. (noting Dallas had ten picks in first four rounds of 1991 draft).
193. See id. at 180.
194. See id. at 181.
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negotiate and sign a Player Contract with any Club.195  These un-
drafted free agents are the great unknowns of the NFL personnel
selection process.
Hundreds of undrafted free agents pour into NFL mini-camps
and training camps each offseason desperate to win a job on the
Club.  While only a dozen or two actually succeed in making the
Club, there is no shortage of undrafted free agent success stories.
Notable undrafted free agents include two-time NFL MVP and
Super Bowl MVP quarterback Kurt Warner, six time Pro Bowl tight
end Antonio Gates, Victor Cruz, the leading receiver for the 2012
Super Bowl Champion Giants, and two-time Super Bowl Champion
and 2008 NFL Defensive Player of the Year James Harrison.196
Clubs generally use signing bonuses to attract the most highly
sought after undrafted free agents.  A player could gauge which
Club was most interested in the player being a part of the Club by
the offer made.  The 2011 CBA, however, limits Clubs to a total of
$75,000 in signing bonuses to be paid to undrafted rookies, an
amount to increase annually with the Rookie Compensation
Pool.197  Clubs’ interests are now less clear as a result of the cap on
signing bonuses to undrafted players.
Failing to make the Club out of training camp is hardly the end
of the road for undrafted free agents either.  Undrafted free agents
can sign with other teams, get tryouts or hopefully get signed to a
Club’s Practice Squad.  A Practice Squad consists of eight players
per Club, who, as the title indicates, practice with the Club but do
not play in games.198  Practice Squad salaries were a minimum of
$5,700 per week during the 2012 season.199  Players are limited to
195. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 6 § 11 (enabling all undrafted free R
agents unencumbered negotiation rights with teams).
196. See Gil Brandt, Warner Tops List of Best Undrafted Players of All Time,
NFL.COM (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/09000d5d816fb4f0/
article/warner-tops-list-of-best-undrafted-players-of-all-time (ranking best un-
drafted free agents in past seventy-five drafts).
197. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at art. 7 § 1(i) (outlining parameters for R
rookie compensation).
198. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 160 (setting out league rules for practice R
squads and practice squad players)
199. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 161 (listing minimum future salaries for R
practice squad players under the collective bargaining agreement by year).  Prac-
tice Squad salaries were a part of the contentious litigation between the NFL and
NFLPA in the late 1980s.  In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the NFLPA challenged
the Clubs’ unilateral agreement to restrict practice squad salaries to $1,000 per
week. See 782 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1991).  The NFLPA adamantly rejected
the NFL’s decision to impose the wage restrictions. See id.  The district court, ap-
plying the Mackey test, determined that the wage restriction was not reached
through arm’s length bargaining and therefore was not protected by the labor
35
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three seasons on the Practice Squad, during which time they can
sign with any other Club at any time.200
Undrafted free agents can help round out the back of the ros-
ter or even prove to be important contributors to a successful Club.
Finding the diamonds in the rough are undoubtedly among a GM’s
finest and proudest moments.  As Gil Brandt, the Cowboys’ Vice
President of Player Personnel from 1960 to 1988, explained in a
2010 article: “General Managers enjoy it when their first-round
draft pick meets those lofty expectations.  And it’s a real bonus
when mid to low-round selections exceed their expectations.  Then
there is the ultimate satisfaction of signing a player who was passed
over entirely in the draft and seeing him become a productive
pro.”201
3. Waivers and Trades
GMs are not done manipulating the roster once the Draft is
complete and undrafted free agents are signed.  GMs are always
evaluating the roster and trying to bring in the best player to gener-
ate competition at every level.  In his first year as GM of the Seattle
Seahawks, John Schneider, along with new head coach Pete Carroll
made 283 roster moves.202  The shuffling was largely to create com-
petition for playing time.  Carroll used the strategy to build teams
that won two national titles in his nine seasons as a college coach at
USC, and Schneider is following a similar blueprint to elevate a
Club that won just nine games in the two seasons before he took
over.203  Beyond the Draft and signing of free agents as discussed
above, Clubs can also acquire players through waivers and trades.
Players with less than four years experience do not become un-
restricted free agents upon their release from a Club.  Instead, such
players must pass through the NFL “waiver” system.204  Pursuant to
exemption. See id.  However, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the district
court’s decision in 1996 and determined that the NFL’s unilateral imposition of
the practice squad salary limitations was protected by the non-statutory labor ex-
emption. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S 231 (1996) (reversing the district
court’s decision).
200. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 160-161 (specifying limits under collec- R
tive bargaining agreement for practice squad players).
201. See Brandt, supra note 196. R
202. See Nate Davis, Seahawks happy to be late to party, 283 roster moves later, Car-
roll’s club is hot but in no way overconfident, USA TODAY, Jan. 13, 2011, at 1C, available
at 2011 WLNR 715505.
203. See Jim Trotter, It Could Happen, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 17, 2011, at 50
(discussing Seattle Seahawks’ offseason personnel strategy).
204. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 155 (describing and laying out rules for R
NFL waiver process).
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the waiver system, other Clubs will have the opportunity to claim
the waived player and his contract with the prior Club.205  The
waiver wire, as it is known, is especially important towards the end-
ing of training camp when Clubs are trimming their rosters from
ninety players down to fifty-three.  GMs and their staff must be dili-
gent in seeing which players have been waived, consult with their
scouting personnel and coaches about the player, and ultimately
make a decision whether to claim the player.  Of course, claiming
the player forces the Club to release or waive one of their own play-
ers to make room on the roster.
The Packers’ success in the 1990s can be attributed in part to
the Packers’ attention to the waiver wire.  Then Packers GM Ron
Wolf had an agreement with then Packers head coach Mike Holm-
gren that the 51st to 53rd players could become expendable if Wolf
saw someone on the waiver wire that was better.206
The waiver system is also meant to prevent Clubs from stashing
young players on the injured reserve or physically unable to per-
form lists.  Before a player with less than four years experience can
be placed on one of these lists, he must be placed on waivers.207
There is thought to be an “unwritten rule” that Clubs do not claim
other Club’s injured players placed on waivers.208  The Patriots pos-
sibly violated this unwritten rule by claiming Giants injured tight
end Jake Ballard during the 2012 offseason, after Ballard helped
the Giants beat the Patriots in the Super Bowl.209
Trades, unlike in other sports, are among the least common
ways a Club acquires new players.  The Salary Cap rules associated
with trades often make them prohibitive.  As discussed earlier, a
player’s signing bonus is prorated over the life of his contract (up
to five years) for Salary Cap purposes.  For example, if a player signs
a five-year deal with a $10 million signing bonus, the bonus is pro-
205. See id. (explaining NFL’s waiver process).
206. See Michael Lombardi, It’s Complicated: How to get to the final 53-man roster,
NFL (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81a1e654/printa-
ble/its-complicated-how-to-get-to-the-final-53man-roster (discussing agreement be-
tween Green Bay Packers’ general manager and head coach).
207. See Christopher Gates, Waivers, The Practice Squad, and How It All Works,
THE DAILY NORSEMAN (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.dailynorseman.com/2012/9/1/
3284495/waivers-the-practice-squad-and-how-it-all-works (explaining how NFL
waiver system works).
208. See Mike Florio, Giants’ Gamble on Ballard Highlights The Risks of Waiving
Injured Players, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (June 12, 2012), http://profootballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2012/06/12/giants-gamble-on-ballard-highlights-risks-of-waiving-in-
jured-players/.
209. See id. (discussing circumstances in which New England Patriots claimed
former New York Giants Tight End off of waivers).
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rated at an annual value of $2 million. The player’s resulting Salary
Cap charge for each season of the contract would be $2 million,
plus his Paragraph 5 salary and any other bonuses or incentives for
that season.  However, when a player is cut from the Club, the re-
maining prorated portions of his signing bonus “accelerate” for-
ward into the season in which the player is cut.210  So in the
previous example, if a player had played two years of the five-year
contract but is cut prior to the third season, the Salary Cap charge
related to his signing bonus would be $6 million in the third year of
the deal: the typical $2 million annual proration, plus the remain-
ing $4 million in prorated signing bonus money for the final two
years of the contract “accelerated” forward.  This acceleration also
occurs when a player is traded, thus requiring Clubs to absorb a
possibly large Salary Cap hit.
Waivers ultimately become the key mechanism by which Clubs
round out their rosters.  Former Raiders personnel executive
Michael Lombardi explained that “building the best possible team
means having great players in every phase of football offense, de-
fense and, most importantly, special teams.”211  Entering week 3 of
the preseason, teams have identified a core of forty players making
up the offense and defense.212  The forty players will include a
kicker, punter and long snapper, with the remaining members of
the special teams unaccounted.213
Clubs generally avoid filling out the roster with veterans.  Vet-
erans with at least four years experience, if on the opening day ros-
ter, effectively have their salary guaranteed for that year.  Such
players are entitled to termination pay once in their career.214  Ter-
mination Pay provides to the released player “the unpaid balance of
his Paragraph 5 Salary for that League Year.”215  Thus, veterans of
marginal talent can often hinder a Club’s necessary flexibility in
shuffling the back end of the roster.
210. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 94 (explaining how cut players’ salaries R
“accelerate” into future years’ team salaries).
211. Lombardi, supra note 206. R
212. See id. (explaining that by week 3 of NFL preseason, most teams will have
identified core group of approximately forty players whose spots on their respec-
tive team’s roster are secure).
213. See id. (explaining typical constitution of NFL roster by week 3 of
preseason).
214. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 157 (explaining players’ eligibility for R
termination pay in NFL).
215. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 157 (explaining amount of termination R
pay players will be eligible for).
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4. Summary
Successful management of the Draft is undoubtedly the most
critical component of a GM’s personnel decisions.  Nevertheless, as
discussed above, there are a variety of ways in which a GM can build
a roster.  Falcons GM Thomas Dimitoff explained that “[t]here are
some very, very talented players coming into this league through
the draft, through free agency, and the easy thing to do is to bring
in the most talented players whether they fit or don’t fit.  You can
win that way, no question about it.”216
Former Chiefs GM Scott Pioli, once Dimitroff’s colleague with
the Patriots, took a more cautious approach: “the key is sus-
tainability.  Do you want to build a team that will win once and then
implode?  I don’t think that’s the job.  The job is to make the diffi-
cult decisions so you can build the kind of team that can be in posi-
tion to win every single year.”217
No matter the approach, an NFL GM clearly has a difficult job
in terms of building a championship roster.  He must balance the
Salary Cap, determine when to pay veteran players and when to let
them go, decide whom the Club will select in the Draft and what
trades are necessary to do that, and finally he must also work with
other GMs to see what, if any, trades are available to improve the
roster.  All these moves should work to build a roster of 90 players
that provide the coaching staff with enough talent to install their
game plans.  The GM then must whittle that roster down to 53 play-
ers who have enough talent to perform on a high level on offense,
defense and special teams while still providing depth at each posi-
tion.  All of this must occur while managing the personalities in the
locker room and among the coaching staff.  This is not possible
alone and therefore great GM’s surround themselves with talented
scouts and personnel executives who can aid the GM in making the
best decisions for the team, as is discussed below.
C. Overseeing Scouting Department
As explained above, roster management and personnel selec-
tion are crucial tasks for an NFL GM.  At any given time during the
regular season, there are nearly 2,000 players under contact with an
216. See Joe Posnanski, A Dream in the Making, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 6,
2010, at 88 (elaborating on processes used by team GMs to build rosters), available
at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1179410/index.
htm.
217. See id. (exploring different approaches used by GMs when building their
team).
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NFL Club either on the active/inactive list, injured reserve, or prac-
tice squad.218  During the preseason, when rosters are expanded to
90 players, there are nearly 3,000 players under contract.  The num-
ber of players is further increased over time when you consider
that, according to the NFLPA, the average NFL career is 3.5
years.219  An NFL Club must be aware of and have a scouting report
on each and every player.
NFL GMs must build and manage a talented scouting staff to
undertake this task.  The best personnel developers in the NFL
aren’t all-knowing “gurus,” but instead run great support staffs, for-
mer Tennessee Titans GM Floyd Reese writes.220  To this point,
Tannenbaum considered himself the “point guard of information,”
making sure everyone in the organization was on the same page.
Tannenbaum consequently believes being a good listener and be-
ing organized are two of the most important traits for a GM.221
NFL Clubs divide the scouting duties between their College
Scouting Department and their Professional Scouting Department.
1. College Scouting
The number of college football players that NFL Clubs must
scout each year is overwhelming.  The NFL lacks an established mi-
nor league and thus looks to collegiate players to fill their ranks
each year.  The CBA dictates that players must be at least three
years removed from their high school class’ graduation in order to
be eligible for the NFL draft.222  The pool of draft eligible players
consists of seniors, juniors, and redshirt sophomores.  With 124
teams playing in the Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly 1-A) and
122 teams playing in the Football Championship Subdivision (for-
merly 1-AA), there are thousands of draft eligible players each
218. See Robert Orlandini, How Many Players are in the NFL, LIVESTRONG.COM,
Jul. 2, 2009, http://www.livestrong.com/article/15471-many-players-nfl/ (calculat-
ing 2,000 NFL players based on 32 teams employing 52 players).
219. See The Average NFL Player, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214058615722.htm (providing
general statistics of NFL players, including average salary, median player salary,
average age, and average number of players on injured reserve).
220. See Floyd Reese, Best Talent Evaluators Take Rrisks, Make Hard Decisions,
ESPN.COM (Feb.26, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/draft08/columns/
story?columnist=reese_floyd&id=3262379 (listing top five current NFL talent evalu-
ators and explaining why each person made his personal list).
221. Interview with Mike Tannenbaum, former General Manager, New York
Jets of the NFL (March 28, 2013).
222. See 2011 CBA, supra note 63, at 46. R
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year.223  Moreover, 41 players were drafted out of Division II, Divi-
sion III, and the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics
(the NCAA’s much smaller competitor) in the 2012 NFL Draft.224
Incredibly, NFL Clubs will seek to evaluate the professional
prospects of each of these thousands of players.  Reese explained
that the arduous scouting process generally begins in the spring
with the GM and the College Scouting Director sending a team of
scouts across the country to see the collegians practice and play.225
An NFL scouting department consists of approximately 10-12
persons, about half of whom will be dedicated to college players.
The college scouts generally focus on a particular area and/or con-
ference(s), e.g., someone might be the “northeast” scout or be re-
sponsible for scouting the Southeastern Conference.  Obviously,
the better the player, the more times a scout, or even the GM, will
go watch.
In addition to their own area scouts, most NFL Clubs also sub-
scribe to one of two scouting services: National or BLESTO.
BLESTO stands for Bears, Lions, Eagles and Steelers Talent Organi-
zation, although now approximately twelve teams use BLESTO.
Both organizations employ scouts to do the same tasks as the area
scouts and then create extensive reports about the players, includ-
ing their “grades.”226
The GM and the scouting department are not only responsible
for grading each player’s physical ability, but must also gather medi-
cal and character information.227  Such information is crucial in
223. See College Football Teams, ESPN.COM (last visited Mar. 10, 2013), http://
espn.go.com/college-football/teams (providing team breakdown of all football
college divisions).
224. See Balladeer, 41 NAIA, D2 and D3 College Football Players to the NFL for
2012, BALLADEER’S BLOG (May 4, 2012), http://glitternight.com/2012/05/04/40-
naia-d2-and-d3-college-football-players-to-the-nfl-for-2012/ (providing list of play-
ers recruited from these lower-tier schools to play in NFL).
225. See Floyd Reese, College Scouts Work Tirelessly and Receive Little Public Credit,
ESPN.COM (Mar. 8, 2008),  (pointing to five specific issues that make job of a col-
lege scout difficult).  The list includes: the scout’s schedule, restrictions placed
upon scouts, the debate surrounding whether or not to scout juniors, national
scouting, and finally the lack of any public glory. See id.
226. See Who are Blesto & the National?, DRAFTDADDY, (last visited Mar. 10,
2013), http://www.draftdaddy.com/features/blesto.htm (describing process used
by two main scouting companies for evaluating draft prospects and providing sub-
scribing teams with such information).
227. See Dr. David Grier, Medical Evaluation of Players Critical at NFL Combine,
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.drdavidgeier.com/medical-evaluation-of-players-criti-
cal-at-nfl-combine/ (explaining lengthy process combine participants must go
through for their complete medical evaluation); see also Dr. David Grier, Medical
Evaluation of Players Critical at NFL Combine, (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.drdavid
geier.com/medical-evaluation-of-players-critical-at-nfl-combine/ (explaining
41
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considering a player’s draftability.  NFL.com writer Pat Kirwan ex-
plained that “[i]n order to really create long-term change, a GM
must fill the roster with good players who also are great men.  It
doesn’t take too many personnel mistakes or bad apples in the
locker room to drag a once-proud franchise to the bottom.  Smart
scouts and great teaching coaches are critical.  For example, “[Patri-
ots Head Coach Bill] Belichick does a great job training his scouts
to find the type of players he wants, and they rarely bring back guys
with character issues or a lack of intellect.”228
Teams nonetheless often gamble that a player’s talent will sur-
pass his character concerns.  Prior to the 2008 NFL Draft many
teams removed former Kansas defensive back Aqib Talib from their
draft boards due to concerns over his character.  A CBS reporter
stated that “[a] GM I trust told me his club was removing Talib’s
name from its board because of character problems.  No one ques-
tions Talib has the talent; what they wonder is if he can stay out of
trouble.”229  The Tampa Bay Buccaneers believed in Talib and
drafted him anyway.  Local reports after the Draft posited that
Talib’s prior troubles “shouldn’t be a stop sign.  Let’s not be naı¨ve
here.  A lot of college students have tried marijuana.  Talib says he
has matured, and the Bucs seem ready to believe him.”230  Talib has
played well, but has also had multiple incidents with the law, leaving
his NFL career teetering on the edge.231
Even if a player does not have any penchant for criminal activ-
ity, it is difficult to know if the player will have the motivation to
succeed at the NFL level.  As former Rams GM Billy Devaney said in
lengthy process combine participants must go through for their complete medical
evaluation).
228. See Pat Kirwan, Here’s the 10 Step Program to Creating a Championship Cul-
ture, NFL.COM, (Jan. 25, 2009),  (explaining the importance of ‘culture’ for foot-
ball teams, which is described as a “process that takes a vision”).  The three main
ingredients are: the owner, the tradition, and the quarterback. See id.
229. See Clark Judge, Draft Prospects – Defensive Backs, CBS SPORTS (April 18,
2008), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/draft/prospectrankings/DEF/CB; see also
[Old article no longer available but text can be found here: http://cowboyszone.
com/forums/showthread.php?p=2042224] (noting character was question for
many clubs due to Talib’s previous off-field behavior).
230. See Gary Shelton, Debates? Talib Has Them Covered, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2008, at 1C, (attempting to explain Bucs’ reasoning for acquiring Talib
despite fact he had tested positive for marijuana three times).  His innate talent
and skill lead the team to take, what some called, a risk. See id.
231. See Michael David Smith, Aqib Talib Described as All but Gone from Tampa
Bay, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (Apr. 24, 2011), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.
com/2011/04/24/aqib-talib-described-as-all-but-gone-from-tampa-bay/ (discuss-
ing Talib’s problems since joining team, which included fight at rookie sympo-
sium, punching teammate in practice, punching cab-driver, and finally assault with
deadly weapon charges).
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an interview, “[y]ou want the kid to come in and think this is the
first step to being a successful player.  Unfortunately a lot of guys
bomb out just for that reason, that OK, I’m here, I’m a high drafted
player, I’ve achieved my goals, then they go on cruise control.
That’s the hard part to figure . . . and you try to spend as much
possible time to get a feel for what the kid is going to be like.  You
have done all the evaluating, the tape study, the combines, the pro
days, the all-star games, now you just try to drill down and get as
good a feel as you can.”232  All of these issues must be flushed out
during the scouting process.
The GM and the College Scouting Director have frequent con-
versations with scouts as the season winds down.  The College
Scouting Department will collect the information from the area
scouts and the scouting services, in order to narrow the list from
around 1,200 prospects to a more manageable 500-600 prospects by
the end of the college football season.233  The GM and scouting
department will then come together following the college and NFL
seasons to create a “Black Board” of prospects deemed undraftable
based on performance, medical, or character concerns.
The GM and scouting department will also begin ranking play-
ers around this time.  College all-star games, such as the Senior
Bowl take place in January, leading up to the NFL Combine in late
February.  The NFL Combine, held annually in Indianapolis, is rou-
tinely called “the biggest job interview of their lives” for players.234
The players undergo extensive examination, including football
drills, speed and agility tests, height, weight and size measurements,
232. See PFT Live- Segment 2, PROFOOTBALLTALK.COM (Aug. 24, 2011), http://
profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/24/pft-live-segment-2-billy-devaney/ (ex-
plaining how players’ personal drive is also important part of scouting process).
233. See Manish Mehta, Inside the New York Jets War Room with GM Mike Tannen-
baum and His Inner Circle, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2011), http://personals.nydaily
news.com/blogs/jets/2011/04/inside-the-new-york-jets-draft-war-room-with-gm-
mike-tannenbaum-his-inner-circle?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&
utm_campaign=feed%3A–ydnrss%2Fblogs%2Fjets+%28Blogs%2FThe+Jet+Stream
%29 (providing inside look into Jets’ scouting personnel and process).
234. See Rick Alonzo, Decker Playing Catch-Up: Ex-Gopher Hopes Foot Injury Won’t
Hurt Draft Stock, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Feb. 28, 2010, at C3; see also Tom
Kowalski, Breaking Through Michigan Players Put Talent on Display, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Feb. 28, 2010, at C6 (providing examples of talented players expressing
importance of their performance in Combine including their own strengths and
weaknesses); Ian R. Rapoport, Combine Notebook: McKenzie, Murphy Talk Things Over,
BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 1, 2010, at 66 (noting importance of not burning out too
early and over-working themselves); John Vellante, Woburn’s McLaughlin Gathers
Postseason Honors, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2010, at 5 (explaining reason for player’s
declining invitation to play in Shriners’ Football Classic because pre-season work-
outs were just mere weeks away).
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an intelligence exam, medical exams, and interviews with NFL
GMs.235
Former Browns and Giants GM Ernie Accorsi once described
the evaluation process leading up to the Draft:
We start to get ready for a draft by gathering all of the
scouts together – the heroes of the whole process – and
talking about every player in the country who’s even re-
motely a prospect.  We grade them, both overall and by
position, and stagger the names all over the[ ] walls.  We’ll
get together often during the year, finally in a marathon
meeting that lasts two or three weeks.  By the time April
rolls around, every top player has had five, six, seven looks.
We start plugging them in by rounds, our own lists of
thirty-two.236
Scouting players for the NFL Draft is part science, part art, and
part pure luck.  But, as longtime baseball executive Branch Rickey
once said, “luck is the residue of design.”  Thus, it is clear why NFL
GMs must be meticulous in their selection and handling of their
college scouting departments.
2. Professional Scouting
As discussed above, the NFL Draft is a three-day forum in
which each Club essentially showcases the work of its college scout-
ing department that year.  Once the final pick of the Draft is en-
tered, all draft eligible players, whether drafted or not, are no
longer the responsibility of the college scouting department, but
now the professional scouting department. The GM and the Pro
Personnel Director are responsible for evaluating all players on the
their own roster, all players on other rosters in the NFL, selected
players in the United Football League (UFL), the Canadian Foot-
235. See Gregg Rosenthal, Jeff Ireland Apologizes To Dez Bryant, PROFOOT-
BALLTALK.COM (Apr. 27, 2010), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/04/
27/jeff-ireland-apologizes-to-dez-bryant/. (explaining it has become common prac-
tice in NFL for teams to ask off-beat or even inappropriate questions to test
player’s ability to handle adversity).  Prior to the 2010 NFL Draft, Miami Dolphins
General Manager Jeff Ireland asked Oklahoma State wide receiver Dez Bryant if
his mother was a prostitute – for which he later apologized. See id; see also Mike
Florio, Ken Herock Says No Question Is Off Limits During Pre-Draft Interviews, PROFOOT-
BALLTALK.COM (Apr. 29, 2010), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/04/
29/ken-herock-says-no-question-is-off-limits-during-pre-draft-interviews/ (pointing
out skepticism raised as to why these type of pre-employment questions are accept-
able in NFL but not in general workforce).
236. See TOM CALLAHAN, THE GM, (Broadway Books, The Crown Publishing
Group 2008).
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ball League (CFL), the Arena Football League (AFL), and certain
players who have played for any of these leagues, but may not cur-
rently be employed in professional football.
The GM must of course oversee the scouting department re-
sponsible for professional players.  The GM and Pro Personnel Di-
rector will have current grades on approximately 2,500 potential
players. It is the team of professional scouts who develop the neces-
sary reports and grades for review by the GM.  Some of these players
will be graded out as not adequate and removed from the database,
while others will be invited to workout with the Club to get a better
assessment of the player.
Professional scouting is important in the world of oft-injured
football players.  Clubs must constantly be prepared to replace guys
with injuries or to replace guys who are underperforming.  Almost
all Clubs hold workouts every Tuesday where they invite in a hand-
ful of free agents at positions about which they are concerned or
interested.  GMs will keep short lists ready of the guys they are inter-
ested in should a spot open up on the roster.
Professional scouting is also crucial prior to and during free
agency.  GMs and their scouting departments will have had to ana-
lyze each player on their roster and project that player’s ability to
contribute to the Club next season.  Where there are gaps, Clubs
must be prepared to fill them through the NFL Draft or free
agency.  If a Club has several talented players at a particular posi-
tion, it might consider trading a player or releasing the higher
priced one.
The professional scouts will grade out every possible free agent
shortly after the end of the regular season.237  The GM, the coaches
and the rest of the staff will then have to determine which players
and positions to target.  It is not uncommon for Clubs to dust off
their college scouting reports to look at a potential free agent’s
character or medical history.  Clubs have limited interactions with
players from opposing Clubs and cannot afford to be hesitant once
free agency commences.
Not surprisingly, data analysis and video technology are in-
creasingly important tools in scouting departments.  New Orleans
Saints General Manager Mickey Loomis discussed the Saints’ in-
creasing use of technology: “[t]eams are always looking to use tech-
237. See Pat Kirwan, There is No Offseason for NFL Personnel Departments,
NFL.COM (Nov. 18, 2008),  (explaining “[e]very player who competed in 2007 will
get a spring film grade to update the team database. That means around 1,700
players should get at least a two-game file grade.”).
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nology in a way that makes sense in their organization,” Loomis
said, “and we’re not unique in that regard.  But [technological ad-
vances] definitely helps us more efficiently process the mountain of
information we have on players.”238  With modern technology, of-
fensive, defensive, and special-teams data points all are instantly ac-
cessible and can provide detailed play-by-play statistics such as
broken and missed tackles, hang time on punts or quarterback
pocket location when he threw the ball.239  Detroit Lions President
Tom Lewand, however, is skeptical of what can be gleaned from an
increased focus on statistics and technology: “[t]here are a lot of
different ways to look at technical innovations.  You’re still dealing
with substantially the same information.  There are just different
ways of processing it.”240  Whether an NFL GM is committed to
more modern objective data, or instead to more old-fashioned sub-
jective data, the fact remains that he is ultimately responsible for
the key scouting decisions that will determine a Club’s future.
The result of the scouting process, whether it be the Club’s
selections in the seven-round of the NFL Draft or in free agency,
are among the most important and scrutinized decisions a GM will
make.  A good addition can help turn around a perennially losing
franchise, while bad choices can end a GM’s career.
D. Coach and Personnel Selection
The GM is generally responsible not only for choosing the
players but also the coaches for those players.  Considering the im-
portance of the head coach and his concomitant salary, the Club
owner and other Club executives may also have a significant say in
the selection of a head coach.  The head coach and GM will then
often work together in putting together a staff of assistant coaches –
depending on the Club’s prior success, some or many of the Club’s
coaches from the prior year may remain on the staff.
GMs and Clubs have adopted various approaches to their
methods for hiring a head coach.  Some clubs might hire in-house
from their current staff of assistants, as is the case with Cowboys
head coach Jason Garrett, Minnesota Vikings head coach Leslie Fra-
zier, and Titans head coach Mike Munchak.  GMs either view these
238. See Nancy Gay, Saints Embrace Evaluation Technology, MSN.COM (Feb. 28,
2011),  (pioneering ICE, Interactive Collaboration and Evaluation, Saints arguably
have “most streamlined system possible for identifying the best NFL prospects”).
239. See id. (admitting in addition to team’s increasing use of technology, he
is not ready to “give up on the old fashioned draft board either”).
240. See id.
46
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 47 14-JUN-13 13:20
2013] NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GENERAL MANAGERS 473
coaches as rising stars they want to hold onto or are more comforta-
ble hiring a head coach with whom they already have a relationship.
When a GM arrives at his position having left a similar role with
another organization, he often might look to the coaches with
which he used to work in hiring a head coach.  For example, when
the Browns’ head coaching position opened prior to the 2011 sea-
son, then Browns and former Eagles GM Tom Heckert looked to a
familiar face.  Heckert hired Pat Shurmur, who had been a coach
with the Eagles from 1999 through 2008, during which time Heck-
ert was an Eagles executive.
If a Club has not produced up to expectations, a GM might
look to hire a coach with a distinctly different personality or ap-
proach as the departing coach in hopes of shaking things up.  For
example, when the Giants underperformed with a 4-12 record in
2003, the Giants fired player-friendly head coach Jim Fassel and re-
placed him with noted disciplinarian Tom Coughlin.  Interestingly,
it is only after Coughlin admittedly lightened up that he was able to
guide the Giants to Super Bowl titles in 2007 and 2011.241
Some GMs prefer to hire veteran coaches with head coaching
experience, even if the experience has not always translated to wins.
For example, the San Diego Chargers surprisingly hired Norv Tur-
ner in 2007.  Turner had previously been the head coach of both
the Redskins and Raiders but had amassed a 58-82 record during
those tenures.  Despite some regular season success, Chargers fans
have never seemed particularly satisfied with Turner’s hiring and
he was fired following the 2012 season.
In contrast, it is common for GMs to hire as head coach an
offensive or defensive coordinator from a successful Club.  For ex-
ample, the Arizona Cardinals hired Ken Whisenhunt as head coach
in 2007, one year after Whisenhunt helped lead the Pittsburgh
Steelers to a Super Bowl title as offensive coordinator.  In 2012, the
Colts hired former Ravens defensive coordinator Chuck Pagano as
its head coach.  Pagano joined Jets head coach Rex Ryan and Cin-
cinnati Bengals head coach Marvin Lewis as former Ravens’ defen-
sive coordinators who rode their success in Baltimore to a head
coaching position.
Lastly, some GMs try to make a splash by hiring a successful
college coach.  The Seahawks hired Pete Carroll in 2010, after Car-
241. See Charean Williams, Giants’ Coughlin Lightened Up, & Super Bowls Fol-
lowed, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.star-telegram.com/
2012/02/02/3708586/giants-coughlin-lightened-up-and.html (noting Coughlin
was given nickname of “Colonel Coughlin” by famous NFL coach Bill Parcells).
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roll had guided the USC Trojans to an 83-19 record over nine sea-
sons.  Similarly, in 2011, the 49ers hired Jim Harbaugh after he
turned the Stanford Cardinal into a national contender.
A head coach often has control over his assistant coaches, but
GMs often insist on retaining longtime assistants or bright young
coaches.  For example, when Rex Ryan was hired as the Jets’ head
coach in 2009, the Jets retained 36-year old Brian Schottenheimer
as offensive coordinator and 61-year old Mike Westhoff as special
teams coordinator.  The Jets and then GM Mike Tannebaum
viewed Schottenheimer as an up and coming coach in the League
while also having a great deal of respect for Westhoff’s experience.
Beyond the coaches, the GM is also generally the person re-
sponsible for hiring and overseeing all of the members of the foot-
ball operations staff, including the salary cap personnel, video
technicians, trainers and equipment managers.  Many GMs, de-
pending on the other titles which they may hold, will also oversee
the various other departments that exist in any corporation, such as
finance, information technology, and marketing.  All of these per-
sons can contribute in some way to the GM’s main focus, the Club’s
success, both on and off the field.
E. Represent the Club
The GM is the generally the face and voice of the franchise,
though certain Club owners, head coaches and quarterbacks de-
mand a certain amount of attention.  It is important that a GM have
a professional demeanor and strong communication skills for the
various roles in which he will be required to represent the Club.
Clearly the most common arena in which a GM must represent
the Club is with the media.  GMs hold regular press conferences at
which they are expected to answer the media’s tough questions and
to provide the information fans expect and want to hear.  Moreo-
ver, media might call, text, or email in hopes of gaining access to
exclusive information and a breaking story.  It is essential that GMs
remain cooperative and courteous rather than combative.  Good
GMs will learn to use the media to their advantage, leaking select
bits of information to perhaps curry public favor, gain leverage in a
contract negotiation or to put pressure on underperforming play-
ers and coaches.
An often overlooked role of a GM is the capacity in which the
GM represents the Club in League matters.  The NFL has approxi-
mately 27 different Committees to analyze and consider important
League matters, including the Competition Committee, Finance
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Committee, Stadium Committee, Broadcasting Committee and
Management Council Executive Committee.242  The Committees,
with approximately eight persons each, consist mostly of owners
and other Club executives, but GMs are also members of several
Committees.  For example, the Competition Committee, responsi-
ble for changes to the rules, includes Ravens GM Ozzie Newsome
and Houston Texans GM Rick Smith.  GMs also serve on the Sub-
committee on College Relations, the Diversity Committee, and, of
course, the General Managers Advisory Committee.243
Participation on these Committees not only allows the GM to
influence the game and business of football beyond their Club, but
also to gain prestige and knowledge.
III. THE QUALIFICATIONS, DEMOGRAPHICS AND CAREER PATHS
OF NFL GMS
As discussed above, being an NFL GM is a desirable but diffi-
cult position.  We can learn more about how people reach this posi-
tion by examining GMs qualifications, demographics and career
paths over the last 20 years.
A. Playing Experience
PLAYING Average Division I Other
EXPERIENCE NFL NFL Career College (FBS) College None
1992 6 7.8 Years 19 11 8 9
(21.4%) (67.9%) (39.3%) (28.6%) (32.1%)
2002 4 10.5 Years 21 15 7 10
(12.5%) (65.6%) (46.9%) (21.9%) (31.3%)
2012 7 7.9 Years 24 10 14 8
(21.9%) (75.0%) (31.3%) (43.8%) (25.0%)
The playing experience of NFL GMs has not changed dramati-
cally over the years.  There is, however, an upward trend of college
playing experience, accompanied by an upward trend of GMs
whose highest playing level was college other than in the Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS).  The most logical explanation for the in-
crease in college experience is that college playing experience is
often a prerequisite to obtaining a scouting position with an NFL
Club.  Scouting, as will be discussed below, is a common path to a
GM position.
The increase in GMs from smaller schools, i.e., non-FBS
schools, is likely a result of not only the interest in NFL football
242. See NFL POLICY MANUAL FOR MEMBER CLUBS, Vol. I.
243. See id.
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nationwide, but also the scouting practices of NFL Clubs.  Clubs
and their scouts are likely aware of almost every small school in the
country that has any hope of producing NFL talent.  Consequently,
players at those smaller schools have increased exposure to get a
foot in the door with an NFL Club.
Not surprisingly, the GMs with professional playing experience
enjoyed relatively lengthy careers – well more than twice the esti-
mated average NFL career of 3.5 years.244  Better, more exper-
ienced players are likely to have a better understanding of the
business of football and how to construct winning Clubs – not to
mention build important relationships to aid their rise to the GM
position.
The most prominent former player GMs are the Ravens’ Ozzie
Newsome (2002-current), who was a Hall of Fame tight end with
the Browns, and the Broncos’ John Elway (2011-current), a Hall of
Fame quarterback who won two Super Bowls with the Broncos.
The most common positions to ascend to the GM position
have been quarterback and tight end.  The quarterbacks include
Elway, Sam Wyche (Buccaneers 1992), Tom Flores (Seahawks 1992-
1994) and Jim Finks (Saints 1986-1993).  The tight ends include
Newsome, Ken Herock (Falcons 1988-96) and Dwight Clark of “The
Catch” (Browns 1998-2002).  Quarterbacks becoming GMs is logical
as a result of the notoriety quarterbacks have, as well as the percep-
tion (borne out by Wonderlic scores) that quarterbacks are often
some of the smarter players on the field.245
The number of GMs without any playing experience has re-
mained largely constant.  These GMs and the paths they took will
be discussed in more detail below.
244. See NFL Hopeful FAQs, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, https://www.nflplayers.com/
About-us/FAQs/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs/ (“The average length of an NFL career is
about 3 and a half seasons.  Although there are some exceptional players who have
long careers that extend 10 or twelve seasons and beyond, most players only stay
active for about three seasons.”).
245. The Wonderlic is an intelligence test prospective NFL players take dur-
ing the NFL Combine.  Quarterbacks have generally scored among the highest.
See Greg A. Bedard, Fitting the Profile, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2011, at 1, available at
2011 WLNR 7961390 (mentioning that quarterbacks had second-highest Wonder-
lic scores behind offensive linemen).
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B. Coaching Experience
COACHING NFL Coaching Division I-FBS Other College No Coaching
EXPERIENCE Experience Coaching Experience Coach Experience Experience
1992 10 (35.7%) 9 (32.1%) 4 (14.3%) 14 (50%)
2002 8 (25.0%) 12 (37.5%) 6 (18.8%) 17 (53.1%)
2012 2 (6.3%) 8 (25.0%) 10 (31.3%) 17 (53.1%)
Coaching experience, particularly at the NFL level, is not a pre-
requisite for becoming an NFL GM.  In each of the years analyzed,
at least half of the GMs had no coaching experience whatsoever.
And in 2012, half of those that had coaching experience, had never
even coached at the highest collegiate level, let alone the NFL.
Since the advent of professional sports, coaches often doubled
as GMs.  That still exists today.  In 1992, two men served as both
head coach and GM: Sam Wyche with the Buccaneers (1992-95);
and Tom Flores with the Seahawks (1992-94).  There were six GM/
head coaches in 2002: Tom Coughlin in Jacksonville (1995-2002);
Andy Reid in Philadelphia (GM effectively from 2001-10); Mike
Sherman in Green Bay (2000-05); Bill Belichick in New England
(2000-present); Mike Holmgren in Seattle (GM effectively from
1999-2002); and Dan Reeves in Atlanta (1997-2003).
The trend towards the GM/head coach position is captured by
legendary NFL coach Bill Parcells’ words upon his departure as
head coach of the Patriots in 1996.  Parcells famously stated: “They
want you to cook the dinner; at least they ought to let you shop for
some of the groceries.  Okay?”246  Parcells comments were believed
to be in reference to the Patriots’ 1996 Draft.  Parcells wanted to
draft a defensive player with the Patriots’ first-round choice, but was
vetoed by Patriots owner Bob Kraft, who instead selected Ohio State
wide receiver Terry Glenn.247
Many of today’s GMs got their start by coaching at small col-
leges before being hired as a scout at in the NFL.  For example,
Jerry Reese of the Giants was an assistant coach at his alma mater,
the University of Tennessee at Martin, from 1986-93 before being
hired by the Giants as a college scout.248  Scott Pioli, former GM of
246. Jeff Darlington, NFL Draft is Full of Options at WR for Miami Dolphins,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 14, 2009, at D5, available at http://content.knowledgeplex.
org/ksg/cache/assets/3821/2989/2989448.html(discussing Parcells’ opinion re-
garding head coach ability to also sign players).
247. See id. (noting Parcells’ aversion to drafting wide receivers).
248. See Front Office: Jerry Reese, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NEW YORK FOOTBALL
GIANTS, http://www.giants.com/team/staff/jerry-reese/a2663861-b927-419b-8c76-
601b77061319 (showing biographical information for Giants’ GM Jerry Reese).
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the Chiefs, coached for two years at Murray State before being
hired by the Browns as a pro personnel assistant.249  And, Tom
Heckert, former GM of the Browns, spent two seasons coaching at
his alma mater, Hillsdale College, before being hired as a scout for
the Eagles.250
C. Age
Average Age When
AGE Average Age 40 and Younger 60 and Older GM For First Time
1992 53.3 2 6 45.9
2002 52.8 1 6 44.8
2012 50.9 2 5 44.7
Whereas in MLB there has been a trend towards younger GMs,
that trend has not noticeably spread to the NFL.251  There is almost
no statistically significant difference between the number of GMs
under 40, over 60, and the age at which GMs become GM for the
first time.
The younger GMs over time include John Shaw (40 with the
Los Angeles Rams in 1992), Jim Irsay (33 with the Colts in 1992),
Ted Sundquist (39 with the Broncos in 2002), Howie Roseman (37
with the Eagles in 2012) and Les Snead (38 with the St. Louis Rams
in 2012).  Irsay obtained the GM position because his father Robert
owned the Club while the other younger GMs all rose through the
ranks with one or more NFL Clubs.
The elder GMs include men who were also owners of the Clubs
and chose to retain player personnel decision making power.  Mike
Brown, owner of the Bengals and born in 1935, has controlled the
Club since 1991.  Al Davis, born in 1929, exercised the same control
over his Raiders since he first became GM in 1962 and controlling
owner in 1972.  Lastly, Jerry Jones, born in 1942, has run the Cow-
boys since buying the Club in 1989.
249. See Scott Pioli, MIT SLOAN SPORTS ANALYTICS CONFERENCE, http://www.
sloansportsconference.com/?p=9601 (summarizing Pioli’s employment history,
achievements, and biographical information).
250. See Tom Heckert General Manager, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE CLEVELAND
BROWNS, http://www.clevelandbrowns.com/team/staff/tom-heckert/3b5733a8-02
c4-41d8-ad30-3c1c17543286 (displaying profile of Cleveland Browns’ current GM).
251. See Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, Major League Baseball General Man-
agers: An Analysis of Their Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18 NINE: J.
BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE, 74 (Spring 2010) (“Additionally, the image of a GM
has changed over time, as there are younger GMs now than ever before and in-
creasing minority representation.”).
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The older GMs that did not own Clubs tend to be football “lif-
ers” with considerable experience.  For example, in 1992, 61-year
old George Young was in his thirteenth season as the GM of the
Giants, having gotten his start in football with the Baltimore Colts
in 1968.  Ernie Accorsi took over Young’s role in 1998, also having
gotten his start with the Baltimore Colts in 1970.  Accorsi remained
with the Giants until retiring in 2007 at the age of 65.  The oldest
GM in 2012 (besides Mike Brown) was Buddy Nix of the Bills.  Nix,
aged 72, became the Bills GM in 2009 after a lengthy college coach-
ing career and 16 years as a scout in the NFL.252
D. Education
Bachelor’s Top 50 Advanced
EDUCATION Degree School253 Degree J.D. M.B.A.
1992 28 (100%) 7 (25.0%) 13 (46.4%) 3 (10.7%) 2 (7.1%)
2002 32 (100%) 11 (34.8%) 16 (50.0%) 2 (6.3%) 1 (3.1%)
2012 32 (100%) 2 (6.3%) 15 (46.9%) 4 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Remarkably, every NFL GM over the last 20 years has earned
his bachelor’s degree.  In the NBA, there are on average 1.7 GMs
each year that do not have a college degree.254  In MLB, where
many players never attend college, both in 1999 and 2009, six GMs
did not have college degrees.255
The most remarkable statistic concerning the education of
NFL GMs is that 11 of them were from Top 50 undergraduate uni-
versities in 2002.  The stellar undergraduates included: Rich McKay
from Princeton (Buccaneers 1993-2003); Matt Millen from Penn
State (Lions 2001-07); Bob Ferguson from the University of Wash-
ington (Cardinals 1996-2005); Mike Holmgren from USC
(Seahawks 1999-2008); John Butler from the University of Illinois
252. See Buddy Nix, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE BUFFALO BILLS, http://www.buf-
falobills.com/team/roster/Buddy-Nix/8c210bdd-5c03-4698-9e8a-b287b9fcbc72
(displaying biography of Bills’ GM from 2010 backward).
253. See National University Rankings, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://
colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-
universities (displaying magazine’s annual ranking of top U.S. universities).
254. See Glenn M. Wong and Chris Deubert, National Basketball Association Gen-
eral Managers: An Analysis of the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 249-50 (2011) (charting NBA GM education and
discussing decrease in college players and advanced degrees amongst general
managers).
255. See Glenn M. Wong & Chris Deubert, Major League Baseball General Man-
agers: An Analysis of Their Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18 NINE: J.
BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE, 74 (Spring 2010) (“While in 1999 and 2009, 24 GMs
(80%) had a four-year degree.”).
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(Bills 1993-2000, Chargers 2001-2003); Terry Donahue from UCLA
(49ers 2001-05); Carl Peterson from UCLA (Chiefs 1989-2008); Bill
Polian from NYU (Bills 1986-1993, Panthers 1994-97, and Colts
1997-2009); Ernie Accorsi from Wake Forest (Browns 1985-1992,
Giants 1998-2007); Floyd Reese from UCLA (Houston Oilers/Ten-
nessee Titans 1994-2006); and Mike Brown from Dartmouth.
The lawyers in the group include Bears’ President from 1983-
2011 Michael McCaskey (Arizona State), Rams’ GM from 1983-1997
John Shaw (University of San Diego),  Mike Brown (Harvard), Rich
McKay (Stetson), Lions GM from 2008-current Martin Mayhew (Ge-
orgetown), Eagles GM from 2010-current Howie Roseman (Ford-
ham), and Jets GM from 2006-2012 Mike Tannenbaum (Tulane).
None of the current GMs ever practiced law – instead leaving law
school and immediately entering the entry levels of the NFL.  May-
hew, an eight year NFL veteran, certainly had a leg up.
Those with MBA’s over the years include Sam Wyche (South
Carolina), Vikings President from 1991-98 Roger Headrick (Colum-
bia), and Headrick’s successor with the Vikings until 2004 Gary
Woods (Southern Methodist).
E. Professional Experience
The section below is an overview of GMs’ NFL working experi-
ence and the previous title they had before they became general
managers.
Front Office Average Years in
PRIOR Experience Position Other NFL Prior to GMs Who Were
EXPERIENCE as a Scout than GM Becoming GM Previously GMs
12
1992 (42.9%) 23 (82.1%) 12.7 2 (7.1%)
14
2002 (43.8%) 23 (71.9%) 13.3 5 (15.6%)
21
2012 (65.6%) 29 (90.1%) 16.1 2 (9.4%)
As has been emphasized throughout this article, player evalua-
tion is an NFL GM’s top priority.  Thus, it is not surprising to see
that over the past 20 years more than half of all GMs had some
experience at the entry levels of player evaluation – scouting.
Then, more than three-quarters of GMs have risen to the GM posi-
tion through other front office positions, such as Assistant General
Manager, Director of Player Personnel or Director of College
Scouting.
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Regardless of the path to the position, NFL GMs in recent
years have more NFL experience prior to becoming GM, as will be
discussed in more detail below.
The persons who avoid the typical path are generally head
coaches.  As discussed earlier, the following head coaches have held
GM or GM-like positions over the years, despite no other front of-
fice experience: Sam Wyche (Buccaneers 1992), Tom Flores
(Seahawks 1992-94), Tom Coughlin (1995-2002), Andy Reid (Phila-
delphia Eagles GM effectively from 2001-10), Bill Belichick (New
England Patriots 2000-present), Mike Holmgren (Seattle Seahawks
GM effectively from 1999-2002), Mike Sherman (Green Bay 2000-
05) and Dan Reeves (Atlanta Falcons 1997-2003).
Others who have avoided working their way through the ranks
include Cowboys owner Jerry Jones and prominent ex-players such
as John Elway (Broncos 2011-current) and Matt Millen (Lions 2001-
07).
NFL Clubs are seemingly less likely to recycle GMs.  Only nine
GM positions in 1992, 2002, and 2012 were being held by individu-
als who had previously served as a GM.  In 1992, Chargers GM
Bobby Beathard had previously helped lead the Redskins to Super
Bowl titles in 1982 and 1987, and Saints GM Jim Finks had previ-
ously served a GM of the Bears.  In 2002, Texans GM Charley Cas-
serly had previously worked for the Redskins, Bills GM Tom
Donahoe had previously worked for the Steelers, Giants GM Ernie
Accorsi had previously worked for the Browns, and Chargers GM
John Butler helped lead the Bills to another Super Bowl appear-
ance in 1994, after 2002 Colts GM Bill Polian was fired.  In 2012,
Redskins GM Bruce Allen previously worked for the Buccaneers
and Browns GM Tom Heckert previously worked for the Eagles.
In contrast, MLB had nineteen recycled GMs in 1989, 1999,
and 2009, and the NBA had seventeen such GMs in the 1988-89,
1998-99, and 2008-09 seasons.256  Opportunities for success are
clearly fleeting in NFL front offices.
256. See id. (charting GM coaching and front office experience); Glenn M.
Wong & Chris Deubert, National Basketball Association General Managers: An Analysis
of the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
213,260 (“Over the past twenty year period, GMs have become more experienced,
having spent more years in the league prior to becoming a GM.”).
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F. Current Experience
CURRENT Average Years in Average Years Average Number of NFL
EXPERIENCE Current Position in the NFL Teams Worked For
1992 5.7 19.4 1.7
2002 5.2 19.4 2.0
2012 5.7 22.2 2.4
The subtle trend over time appears to be that NFL GMs have
more experience in the NFL.  This makes sense.  NFL GM positions
have become increasingly competitive over the years.  Thus, aspir-
ing GMs take the opportunity for a promotion with another Club
and often have to wait fifteen or more years before getting the op-
portunity to become a GM.
Mike Holovak of the Houston Oilers was the most experienced
GM in 1992, having amassed 35 years of experience as a player with
the Rams and Bears, then as a coach and executive with the Patri-
ots, 49ers, and Oilers.  Roger Headrick of the Vikings was the least
experienced GM, having joined the Vikings in 1991 as a former bus-
iness executive with no NFL experience.257
The most experienced GM in 2002 was Al Davis, in his 41st
year with the Raiders as a coach, executive and owner.  Right across
the San Francisco Bay, 49ers GM Terry Donahue was in his second
season as GM and only fourth season in the NFL after having served
as the head coach at UCLA from 1976-1995.
In 2012, Davis, having passed away in 2011, ceded the mantle
of most-experienced to fellow longtime owner Mike Brown, who
has been with the Bengals in some capacity since his father, Paul,
founded the Club in 1968.  The least experienced GMs (Howie
Roseman of the Eagles and Les Snead of the Rams) still had 12
years of experience in the NFL.  Roseman’s and Snead’s experience
reflects that almost universally an NFL GM must work his way
through the ranks.
A GM’s need to make upward movements from Club to Club
can also be demonstrated by the number of GMs who have only
worked for one NFL Club.  In 1992, 15 (53.6%) of GMs were still
with their first NFL Club.  In 2012, only ten GMs (31.3%) were still
with their original Club.
257. See Mike Gelfand, Old Buddy Brooks Didn’t Miss Too Much Good Sports News:
1990 Wasn’t Greatest Year for Local Heroes on Minnesota’s Teams, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Dec. 30, 1990, at 14C, available at 1990 WLNR 2772939; Bob Sansevere,
Globe-Trotting Lynn Soon Will Pass the G.M. Torch, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 30,
1990, at 2C, available at 1990 WLNR 2773392 (chronicling Vikings’ GM change).
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The average tenure of an NFL GM is largely unchanged over
the last twenty years.  The average tenure dropped in 2002 when
there were eleven GMs in either their first or second year on the
job: Ted Sundquist (Broncos 2002-08); Matt Millen (Lions 2001-
08); Andy Reid (Eagles GM effectively from 2001-10); Mickey Loo-
mis (Saints 2002-current); Jerry Angelo (Bears 2001-11); Charley
Casserly (Texans 2002-06); Tom Donahoe (Bills 2001-05); John But-
ler (Chargers 2001-03); Terry Donahue (49ers 2001-05); Terry
Bradway (Jets 2001-06); and Charley Armey (Rams 2001-04).
G. Race and Gender
RACE AND
GENDER Caucasian African-American Hispanic Male
1992 27 (96.4%) 0 1 (3.6%) 28 (100%)
2002 31 (96.9%) 1 (3.1%) 0 32 (100%)
2012 26 (81.2%) 6 (18.8%) 0 32 (100%)
Despite the fact that approximately 67% of NFL players are Af-
rican-American, NFL Clubs, as in many other sports, have been slow
to incorporate minorities into their front offices.258  Tom Flores, a
Hispanic, was the NFL’s only minority GM in 1992 while also coach-
ing the Seahawks.  Ten years later, Ozzie Newsome replaced Flores
as the lone minority GM in the NFL.
Perhaps even more astonishing than the lack of African-Ameri-
cans in the front office was the lack of African-Americans serving as
head coaches.  In 2002, there were only two minority coaches: Tony
Dungy with the Colts and Herman Edwards with the Jets.259  To ad-
dress this disparity, in 2003, the NFL, at the insistence of Steelers
owner Dan Rooney, enacted what became known as “The Rooney
Rule.”260  The Rooney Rule requires Clubs to interview at least one
258. See Richard Lapchick, The 2011 Racial & Gender Report Card: National Foot-
ball League, TIDE SPORT (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.tidesport.org/RGRC/2011/
RGRC_NFL_2011_FINAL.pdf (“The NFL’s score for race decreased slightly from
90.6 in the previous report to 90.4 points out of 100 . . . 67% of all players in the
NFL are Black.”).
259. See Patrick K. Thornton, The Increased Opportunity for Minorities in the Na-
tional Football League Coaching Ranks: The Initial Success of the NFL’s Rooney Rule, 6
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 45, 49 (2009) (stating that Edwards was only new African
American coach hired since Dungy transferred from Tampa Bay to Indianapolis).
260. See id. at 50; Greg Garber, Thanks to Rooney Rule, Doors Opened, ESPN.COM
(Feb. 9, 2007, 3:03 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs06/news/story?id
=2750645 (discussing passing of Rooney Rule, “Teams were required to interview
at least one minority candidate when filling a head coaching position—or be
fined.”).
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minority candidate when looking to fill their head coaching
vacancy.
The Rooney Rule has proven successful.  Prior to its enact-
ment, there had only been six minority head coaches in the history
of the NFL: Flores, Art Shell (Raiders 1989-94, 2006), Dennis Green
(Vikings 1992-2001, Cardinals 2004-06), Ray Rhodes (Eagles 1995-
98, Packers 1999), Dungy and Edwards.  Since the Rooney Rule’s
enactment, nine more minorities have become head coaches: Ron
Rivera (Panthers 2011-current), Lovie Smith (Bears 2004-12), Mar-
vin Lewis (Bengals 2003-current), Romeo Crennel (Browns 2005-
08, Chiefs 2011-12), Leslie Frazier (Minnesota Vikings 2010-cur-
rent), Mike Tomlin (Steelers 2007-current), Mike Singletary (49ers
2008-10) Hue Jackson (Raiders 2011) and Raheem Morris (Buc-
caneers 2009-11).
As a result of The Rooney Rule’s success on the field, the NFL
extended its application to all searches for senior football opera-
tions positions prior to the 2009 season.261  Newsome, the lone Afri-
can-American GM in 2002, was joined the next year by Rod Graves
of the Cardinals.  Then several NFL Clubs promoted African-Ameri-
cans to GM positions in the late 2000s: the Texans promoted Rick
Smith to GM in 2006; the Giants promoted Jerry Reese to GM in
2007; and the Lions promoted Martin Mayhew to GM in 2008.  The
sixth African-American GM currently working in the NFL is Reggie
McKenzie of the Raiders, hired prior to the 2012 season.
Despite the progress made in racial diversity, the sports world,
including the NFL, is still waiting for the first female GM.  There
are, however, several prominent female executives of NFL Clubs:
Amy Trask has been President and CEO of the Raiders since 2005;
Dawn Aponte has held several executive positions within the NFL,
including at NFL headquarters, with the Browns and with the Dol-
phins; and Katie Blackburn, the daughter of Bengals owner Mike
Brown, is the Club’s Executive Vice President.262  While both
261. See Tim Smith, The Score: Rooney Rule for GMs Would Be Job Well Done, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS 71, May 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9890422 (discussing NFL
proposal to expand Rooney Rule in May 2009); Patricia Sheridan, Dan Rooney,
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jul. 18, 2011, at C1, available at 2011 WLNR 14203481 (dis-
cussing Rooney Rule’s application to GMs in 2011).
262. See Elizabeth Merrill, Raiders’ Amy Trask Driven Like Davis, ESPN (Nov. 3,
2011), http://espn.go.com/espnw/more-sports/7181147/oakland-raiders-ceo-
amy-trask-driven-mentor-al-davis (profiling Trask 14 years into her tenure as Raid-
ers’ CEO); see also Dawn Aponte, MIAMI DOLPHINS (last visited Feb. 14, 2013), http:/
/dolphins.studiotigaapps.net/front-office-bios/football-operations/senior-foot-
ball-executives/dawn-aponte.aspx (chronicling Aponte’s career as Senior Vice
President of Football Operations for Miami Dolphins); see also Mark Curnutte, GM
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Aponte and Blackburn have been responsible for negotiating
player contracts, no NFL Club has ever turned over its player per-
sonnel decisions to a woman.
IV. COMMON CAREER PATHS
As demonstrated above, the demographics and experience of
NFL GMs have not changed dramatically over time.  Consequently,
established paths to the GM position have developed while the pop-
ularity of newer ones remains to be seen.  The career paths below
are ordered in terms of their accessibility to the general public,
starting with the least accessible.
A. Former NFL Player
Understandably, several NFL GMs have NFL playing experi-
ence.  While many former players become coaches, there is a steady
population of ex-players that reach the front office.  As discussed
below, seventeen GM positions during the 1992, 2002 and 2012 sea-
sons were filled by men with NFL playing experience.
The NFL playing experience has assisted these GMs in bypas-
sing a common prerequisite to becoming a GM: scouting experi-
ence.  As highlighted above, approximately 51% of GMs in the
years examined had scouting experience, including 65.6% (21
GMs) in 2012.  However, only seven of the seventeen (41.2%) for-
mer players also worked as scouts.263  In 1992, Ken Herock of the
Falcons had previously worked as a scout for Raiders and Buc-
caneers, and Larry Wilson of the Cardinals rose to GM in 1988 after
serving in a scouting capacity for the previous fifteen seasons.264  Of
the 2002 GMs, Dwight Clark of the Browns got his start by working
as a scout for his old team, the 49ers, and Ozzie Newsome of the
Ravens also got his start by scouting with his former club, the
Role Proving Full-Time Necessity, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 4, 2007, at C1 (noting
extensive staff required in addition to head coach to run Indianapolis Colts).
263. See Marc Lillibridge, Power Ranking All 32 NFL General Mangers, BLEACHER
REPORT (Nov. 16, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1411114-power-rank-
ing-all-32-nfl-general-managers (summarizing careers of all thirty-two NFL General
Managers of 2012).
264. See Mike Tierney, A Finishing School of Tough Love for Draftees, N.Y. TIMES
(April 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/sports/football/nfl-fin-
ishing-school-emphasizes-herocks-tough-love.html?pagewanted=all (reporting Her-
ock’s transition to private draft advisor after 50 years as NFL “player, scout, coach,
personnel director, or general manager.”); see also Hall of Fame, ARIZONA CARDINALS
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013) http://www.azcardinals.com/history/hall-of-fame.html
(remarking on Wilson’s career with Arizona Cardinals from player to manager
from 1960 to 2003).
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Browns.265  In 2012, Ryan Grigson, GM of the Colts, followed up his
one-year NFL career with several years as a scout for the Rams, and
Reggie McKenzie of the Raiders started his post-playing career as a
scout with the Packers.266
The coaching experience of former players has changed dra-
matically.  In 1992, five of the six GMs with NFL playing experience
had also coached in the NFL: Sam Wyche was coach/GM of the
Buccaneers; Tom Flores was coach/GM of the Seahawks; Falcons
GM Ken Herock previously worked as a tight ends coach for the
Raiders; Larry Wilson of the Cardinals worked as the Cardinals in-
terim head coach in 1979; and Mike Holovak of the Oilers had pre-
viously served as head coach of the Boston Patriots.267  In contrast,
none of the seven 2012 GMs with NFL playing experience ever
coached in the NFL: Martin Mayhew (Detroit 2008-current); Reggie
McKenzie (Oakland 2012-current); Ozzie Newsome (Baltimore
2002-current); Ryan Grigson (Indianapolis 2012-current); Bruce Al-
len (Washington 2009-current); John Elway (Denver 2011-current);
and Ted Thompson (Green Bay 2005-present).268
The best former players to become GMs are undoubtedly New-
some and Elway.  Elway, the Broncos quarterback from 1983-1999,
265. See Jack Thompson, 49ers’ Clark Likely Bound for Browns, CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Nov. 29, 1998), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-11-29/sports/98112901
81_1_browns-president-carmen-policy-dwight-clark-cleveland-browns (summarizing
Clark’s football career at transition from San Francisco to Cleveland); see also Ozzie
Newsome, BALTIMORE RAVENS (last visited Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.baltimorera-
vens.com/team/staff/Ozzie-Newsome/d15bf396-96c8-4050-aead-27a541ac2855
(summarizing Newsome’s football career and highlighting successes with Balti-
more Ravens).
266. See Ryan Grigson, General Manager, INDIANAPOLIS COLTS (last visited Feb.
18, 2013), http://www.colts.com/team/staff/Ryan-Grigson/d89d12a6-623d-4ccb-
ae8b-9c3e20720b50 (tracing Grigson’s career from NFL rookie, scout, to Colts’
GM); see also McKenzie Introduced as General Manager, OKLAHOMA RAIDERS (Jan. 10,
2012), http://www.raiders.com/news/article-1/McKenzie-Introduced-as-General-
Manager/14bb5161-8b42-4139-917f-9e691bb6768a (reporting Raiders’ hiring Mc-
Kenzie as team’s GM and providing career background).
267. See United Press International, Tom Flores Named Seahawks President, Gen-
eral Manager, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-22/
sports/sp-393_1_tom-flores (reporting Flores’ transition to Seahawks GM after 22-
year career as player and coach for Raiders); see also Tierney, supra note 264 (sum- R
marizing Herock’s career); see also Hall of Fame, supra note 264 (summarizing Wil- R
son’s career with Cardinals); see also Mike Reiss, Mike Holovak, 88; Star Back for BC
Became Second-Winningest Coach of Patriots, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2008, http://
www.boston.com/bostonglobe/obituaries/articles/2008/01/28/mike_holovak_88
_star_back_for_bc_became_second_winningest_coach_of_patriots/ (remembering
Holovak’s football career after death in 2008).
268. See Marc Lillibridge, Power Ranking All 32 NFL General Mangers, BLEACHER
REPORT (Nov. 16, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1411114-power-rank-
ing-all-32-nfl-general-managers (summarizing careers of all thirty-two NFL General
Managers of 2012).
60
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-2\VLS205.txt unknown Seq: 61 14-JUN-13 13:20
2013] NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GENERAL MANAGERS 487
was a nine-time Pro Bowler, won two Super Bowls and was elected
to the Hall of Fame in 2004.269  Newsome played tight end for the
Browns from 1978-90, made three Pro Bowls and was elected into
the Hall of Fame in 1999.270
Perhaps the most interesting path of a former player belongs
to Mayhew.  Mayhew, a Florida State graduate, played cornerback
for the Redskins and Buccaneers from 1989-96.  Following his re-
tirement, Mayhew earned his law degree at Georgetown, graduating
in 2000.  Mayhew joined the Lions the next year as Senior Director
of Football Administration/Staff Counsel.  Thereafter, Mayhew
moved through the ranks until becoming GM in 2008.271
B. Former Coach College Player to Scout
Perhaps the most common path for NFL GMs is former col-
legiate player turned scout.  Seventeen of the thirty-two 2012 GMs
followed this path (53.1%).272  This should not be particularly sur-
prising.  While only about 2,000 men are skilled enough and pos-
sess the requisite physical characteristics to play in the NFL each
year, there are more than 60,000 young men playing college foot-
ball each year across the three Divisions.273  Certainly many of these
young men aspire to have careers in football even if their playing
careers are limited.
The level of college football played also seems largely irrele-
vant.  Eleven of the seventeen 2012 GMs turned scouts did not play
Division I-FBS football.  Only three of those eleven even played Di-
vision I-FCS football: Jerry Reese of the Giants (University of Ten-
nessee at Martin); Scott Pioli of the Chiefs (Central Connecticut
State); and Rick Spielman of the Vikings (Southern Illinois).  Four
of the GMs even hail from Division III schools: John Schneider of
269. See John Elway, Executive Vice President of Football Operations, DENVER BRON-
COS (last visited Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.denverbroncos.com/team/staff/John-
Elway/37e10403-2561-4e20-8e5e-bf841f14cf89 (detailing Elway’s career path from
player to manager).
270. See Ozzie Newsome, supra note 265 (listing Newsome’s career successes). R
271. See Martin Mayhew, DETROIT LIONS (last visited Feb. 14, 2013), http://
www.detroitlions.com/team/staff/martin-mayhew/c907f443-35e8-40fb-a48b-512e
27d1b778 (profiling Mayhew’s rise from NFL superstar to Detroit Lions GM).
272. See Marc Lillibridge, Power Ranking All 32 NFL General Mangers, BLEACHER
REPORT (Nov. 16, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1411114-power-rank-
ing-all-32-nfl-general-managers (summarizing careers of all 32 NFL General Man-
agers of 2012).
273. See NCAA, 1999-2000 – 2009-10 STUDENT ATHLETE ETHNICITY REPORT (re-
porting 66,313 men played Division I, II, and III football in 2009-2010), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/SAEREP11.pdf (compiling
statistics on race of collegiate athletics participants).
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the Seahawks (University of St. Thomas); Tom Heckert of the
Browns (Hillsdale College); Gene Smith of the Jaguars (Heidelberg
University); and A.J. Smith of the Chargers (Kentucky Wesleyan).274
Ambitious former college players have clearly been able to turn
their advanced knowledge of the game of football into foot-in-the-
door opportunities evaluating talent at the NFL level.  Those op-
portunities are all the more available in light of the fact that NFL
Clubs seem not to discriminate against those from smaller schools.
From the Club’s perspective, it is not a particularly risky venture to
take on a former college player, let him perform some scouting ser-
vices for a year and then reevaluate.  Entry level scouts are poorly
paid (as low as $20,000) and finding new and eager persons to take
their place in the event they do not work out is simple.
Not surprisingly, the scouting departments of any NFL Club
are filled with former college players of varying success looking to
climb the ladder.  The competition is fierce, but their chosen path
is well-traveled.
C. Salary Cap Expert
There are of course many people who aspire to become NFL
GMs even though they never have and never will possess the physi-
cal attributes and skill to become a professional or even collegiate
football player, which experience often serves as a prerequisite to a
coaching career.  These people are not necessarily shut out from
achieving their dreams.  Instead, these historically must have an as-
tute business acumen, and, in recent years, a mastery of the NFL
CBA and Salary Cap.
Entering the 2012 season, there were four GMs who fit this
description: Mickey Loomis of the Saints, Marty Hurney of the
Panthers, Howie Roseman of the Eagles and Mike Tannenbaum of
the Jets.
274. See Jerry Reese, Sr. VP and General Manager, NEW YORK GIANTS (last visited
Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.giants.com/team/staff/jerry-reese/a2663861-b927-41
9b-8c76-601b77061319 (providing career biography of Reese); see also Scott Pioli,
supra note 249; see also Rick Spielman, General Manger, MINNESOTA VIKINGS (last vis- R
ited Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.vikings.com/team/staff/rick-spielman/2616f5fa-
5818-4289-a4d1-ddb7daf8b07c; see also John Schneider, SEATTLE SEAHAWKS (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.seahawks.com/team/staff/John-Schneider/940d
6037-3d45-4898-821f-221e8caa444d; see also Tom Heckert, Cleveland Browns (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.clevelandbrowns.com/team/staff/tom-heckert/
3b5733a8-02c4-41d8-ad30-3c1c17543286; see also Gene Smith, Jacksonville Jaguars
(last visited Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.jaguars.com/team/scouts/gene-smith.
html; see also A.J. Smith, SAN DIEGO CHARGERS (last visited Feb. 19, 2013), http://
www.chargers.com/team/staff/a-j-smith/6c7c44d5-f76e-471a-85c8-439dfee97abb
(providing which GMs did not play Division I-FBS).
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Hurney’s story is perhaps best characterized by good timing.
Hurney began his career in sports as a writer covering the Redskins
in the 1980s.275  He joined the Redskins public relations depart-
ment in 1988 and next joined the Chargers in an administrative
capacity in 1990.276  When the Salary Cap was implemented in
1993, Hurney emerged as the Club’s specialist with the Cap.277
Hurney joined the Panthers in 1998 in a similar role.278  Finally, in
2002, Hurney ascended to the GM position.279  Hurney was fired
midway through the 2012 season.280
Loomis’ career path reflects a reward for diligence in the
sports industry.  Loomis joined the Seahawks in 1983 within a year
after graduating with a master’s degree in sports administration.281
Loomis had previously earned his accounting degree from the Uni-
versity of Oregon.282  Loomis spent 15 years with the Seahawks in a
variety of business-focused positions, including Vice President/Fi-
nance and Executive Vice President.283  Loomis, like Hurney, likely
benefited from being with an NFL Club at the time the Salary Cap
was first implemented and being forced to assume the responsibil-
ity. Loomis joined the Saints in 2000 as the Director of Football
Administration, responsible for contract negotiations and Salary
Cap management, and was promoted to GM in 2002.284
Perhaps the best modern inspirations for the unathletic who
nonetheless aspire to become NFL GMs are Tannenbaum and
Roseman, who share very similar stories of education, work ethic
and sacrifice.
275. See Matt Hurney, CAROLINA PANTHERS, (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) http://
www.panthers.com/team/staff/marty-hurney/158dba70-3404-4c01-b1cc-d948ae55
c100 (giving overview of Hurney’s career in football)
276. See id. (commenting that Hurney’s writings caught attention of Redskins’
owner Jack Kent Cooke, leading to job offer with Redskins public relations
department).
277. See id. (describing Hurney’s emergence with team).
278. See id. (describing Hurney’s duties managing salary cap and coordinating
with other staff).
279. See id. (explaining GM duties include managing scouting department
and coordinating player salaries under Cap).
280. See Pat Yasinkas, Panthers Fire GM Marty Hurney, ESPN (Oct. 22, 2012, 5:07
PM) http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/_/id/8795617/new-york-jets-fire-
mike-tannenbaum-rex-ryan-keep-job (reporting Panthers’ decision to fire Hurney
when Panthers record was worst in its conference).
281. See Mickey Loomis, NEW ORLEANS SAINTS, (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) http:/
/www.neworleanssaints.com/team/staff/mickey-loomis/39e8ebc4-2cec-46b2-8d0c-
a5607c01a6ce (referencing Loomis’s master’s degree from Wichita State
University)
282. See id. (discussing Loomis’ educational history).
283. See id. (discussing Loomis’ first job in NFL).
284. See id.
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Tannenbaum earned an accounting degree from UMass-Am-
herst before heading off to Tulane Law School.285  While at Tulane,
Tannenbaum worked as an intern and player personnel assistant
for both the Saints and Browns.286  By that time, Tannenbam had
made it his goal to become a GM and built an “infrastructure”
within and around himself designed solely to reach that goal.287
While with the Browns, Tannenbaum had the opportunity to work
with then Browns’ head coach Bill Belichick.  When Belichick was
fired after the 1995 season, he returned to being an assistant to his
mentor, Bill Parcells, in New England for the 1996 season.  Parcells
was hired as the Jets head coach prior to the 1997 season, bringing
Belichick with him as defensive coordinator.  Tannenbaum, having
just graduated from Tulane, used his relationship with Belichick to
assist in being hired as the Jets’ Director of Player Contracts that
same season.288
Tannenbaum added various titles over the next few years, re-
flecting his education in the game of professional football.  For ex-
ample, in 2000, Tannenbaum added the title “Director of Pro
Player Development,” indicating increased responsibility for talent
evaluation and cultivation.289
When Parcells left the Jets after the 2000 season, longtime
Chiefs’ personnel executive Terry Bradway took over as GM.290
Tannenbaum was also then elevated to Assistant GM/Director of
Pro Personnel.291  Finally, after nine full seasons of tutelage, Tan-
nenbaum was promoted to GM in 2006, taking responsibility for all
player personnel decisions.292  Tannenbaum was fired following the
285. See Mike Tannenbaum, N.Y. JETS (last visited Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.
newyorkjets.com/ms/media-guide/2012/html/Tannenbaum,-Mike-1.html
286. See id.
287. See Interview with Mike Tannenbaum, former General Manager, New
York Jets of the NFL (March 28, 2013).
288. See id. (adding that Tannenbaum served as Director of Player Contracts
for three seasons).
289. See id.
290. See Terry Bradway, N.Y. JETS, http://www.newyorkjets.com/ms/media-
guide/2012/html/Bradway,-Terry.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013), (chronicling
Bradway’s career with N.Y. Jets).
291. See Mike Tannenbaum, supra note 285 (stating Tannenbaum was pro- R
moted to assistant general manager/director of pro personnel in 2001).
292. See id. (adding that Tannenbaum also served as senior vice president,
football operations/assistant general manager before promotion to GM).
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2012 season.293  In his seven years as GM, the Jets had a 57-55 regu-
lar season record and reached two AFC Championship games.294
Roseman executed a very similar path of determination and
education.  While still in high school, Roseman began sending let-
ters to NFL Clubs on a regular (if not constant) basis inquiring
about positions.295  The letters continued while Roseman earned
his undergraduate degree from the University of Florida and his
J.D. from Fordham Law School in his hometown of New York
City.296  Tannenbaum, perhaps seeing some of himself in Roseman,
interviewed Roseman for a position in 1999.297  The Eagles, im-
pressed with Roseman’s tenacity, also interviewed Roseman and
eventually hired him as an unpaid intern prior to the 2000
season.298
Roseman took full advantage of his internship, finishing each
night of work by watching film.299  A few months later, Roseman
earned himself a full-time position as Salary Cap/Staff Counsel, as-
sisting Eagles’ President Joe Banner with research and contract ne-
gotiations.300  In the following years, Roseman took his football
education to the next level by giving unsolicited scouting reports to
head coach Andy Reid and Pro Personnel Director Tom
Heckert.301
Roseman slowly ascended in the Eagles’ front office, becoming
Director of Football Administration in 2003 and Vice President of
293. See Rich Cimini, Jets Fire GM Mike Tannenbaum, ESPN (Jan. 2, 2013, 12:29
AM), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/_/id/8795617/new-york-jets-fire-
mike-tannenbaum-rex-ryan-keep-job (reporting Jets’ decision to replace Tannen-
baum after disappointment with 6-10 record).
294. See id. (adding that Jets reached playoffs three times under
Tannenbaum).
295. See Mike Jensen, Howie Roseman Relentlessly Pursued NFL Dream, PHILADEL-
PHIA INQUIRER (July 19, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-19/sports/2497
0640_1_howie-roseman-joe-banner-nfl-dream (discussing Jensen’s life-long focus
on becoming GM of NFL team).
296. See id. (stating Roseman continually sent letters to NFL teams starting in
high school).
297. See id. (reporting Tannenbaum as saying he only interviewed Roseman
because “I have 20 letters from you, and every time I send you a rejection, you’d
send a thank you for the rejection”).
298. See id. (stating Roseman persistently called both Joe Banner, President of
Eagles, along with his administrative assistants in hopes of Banner returning his
calls).
299. See id. (noting watching tape was not part of Roseman’s job).
300. See id. (reporting that even at beginning of his career when Roseman was
given ‘simple’ tasks he did extensive research, impressing his employer).
301. See id. (reporting that Roseman’s unsolicited scouting reports consisted
of approximately 150 college players from 2003 to 2006).
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Football Administration in 2006.302  A titanic shift in responsibility
occurred in 2008, when Roseman was named Vice President of
Player Personnel, taking on responsibility for player personnel deci-
sions as opposed to mere Salary Cap and business-related duties.303
Heckert was named Eagles GM in 2006, but final say in football
matters still belonged to Reid.  Consequently, Heckert left the Ea-
gles to become GM of the Browns in 2010.  Heckert’s departure
created the vacancy for Roseman to fulfill his lifelong dream.
Roseman was named GM and is currently responsible for the Eagles
football operations, including signing free agents and participating
in draft selections.
Roseman’s rise to prominence, however, has not necessarily sat
well with the football lifers.  In his first offseason as GM, Roseman
was criticized for allegedly “trying to be too smart for his own good”
and trying to “bamboozle people” in seeking a trade partner for
longtime Eagles quarterback Donovan McNabb.304  Roseman
thought the criticism unfortunate and stated that he was still work-
ing to develop relationships with other Clubs’ GMs.305
Whether the paths laid out by Tannenbaum and Roseman will
become more common among NFL GMs remains to be seen.  The
recent terminations of Hurney and Tannenbaum suggest Clubs will
steer towards hiring more traditional candidates with considerable
scouting and player personnel experience.  Nevertheless, the ma-
jority of NFL Clubs employ persons with law degrees as their Direc-
tors of Football Administration or similar titles responsible for the
Salary Cap.  These individuals undoubtedly seek to broaden their
understanding of the game of football in hopes of one day being
elevated to GM.  Moreover, there are dozens, if not hundreds, of
aspiring GMs in college or law school, who view the trail blazed by
Tannenbaum and Roseman as a source of inspiration and hope.
302. See id. (noting Roseman’s promotions in 2003 and 2006).
303. See id. (stating that Roseman’s promotion to vice president of player per-
sonnel attracted much attention primarily because “one of these lawyers was
switching over to the scouting side”).
304. See Mike Jensen, The New Kid on the Block Takes His Lumps, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER (July 19, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-07-19/sports/24970855_
1_mike-tannenbaum-trades-quarterback-market (noting remarks from anonymous
GM concerning Roseman).
305. See id. (quoting Roseman as saying “I felt that it’s important in the
months after I took this job that I reach them out to [general managers].  I tried to
develop those relationships.  That comes with time.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The role of the NFL GM is complicated, multi-faceted, and
about as stressful as any job on earth.  Nevertheless, the position is
as desired as it is demanding.  This article analyzed the duties and
characteristics of a GM while providing guidance to prospective
GMs.
Generally, at least some college playing experience is a re-
quired attribute of future NFL GMs.  It is not necessarily the playing
experience that is important, but the fact that playing experience
often leads to experience in the most important aspect of a GM’s
duties: player evaluation.  Even though there is a path for those not
skilled enough to play the game at a high level, they too will have to
prove they can evaluate talent and find the players that will help the
Club win football games.  Bottom line, no skill is as important to
NFL GMs as the ability to evaluate talent and make player person-
nel decisions.
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